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1. Introduction 
1.1  Background  
            The world’s financial system is constantly under attack by both outside forces and 
insider attacks.  Over the past ten years the financial systems of the world has migrated 
from traditional brick and mortar buildings to online banking, bill pay and commerce 
(Benioff, 2005).   This shift in transactions has prompted the world to take a serious look 
at the health of the infrastructure that supports the world’s financial system.    
             Banking and finance has been named as two of the 11 critical infrastructures that 
are vital to the existence of Americans by the Department of Homeland Security (Lewis, 
2006).   Banking and finance has been increasingly dependent on the use of information 
technology and must be highly secure in order to maintain the confidentially, integrity, 
and availability of banking data and personal data (Streff, 2007).   
 Data breaches affect millions of people each year, and frequently result in identity 
theft and personal information being compromised.  The Chronology of Data Breaches, 
published by PrivacyRights.org, list that there have been 262,582,926 data breaches that 
have involved sensitive information since January of 2005 (Chronology of Data 
Breaches, 2009).   Data breaches can result in the loss of personal information that can 
lead to identity theft.  Financial institutions, by nature, house personal information that 
can and does result in identity theft after a data breach (Streff, 2007).  
 Government regulations and legislation oversee the banking and financial sector.  
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act requires all financial institutions to conduct an information 
technology risk assessment (RA) to identify security risks to non-public customer 
information (The Gramm-Leach Bliley Act, 1999). Small and medium-sized financial 
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institutions (SMFIs) struggle with this important exercise and often do not understand 
how to adequately integrate the important act into their banking practices. Therefore, 
community banks, credit unions and other SMFIs do not typically have a good 
understanding of what represents real information security risk to their financial 
institution, and what mitigating countermeasures should be deployed (Podhradsky, 2009).  
           The RA process identifies the risk associated with the information technology 
assets of the financial institution, and demonstrates the level of security of each asset, and 
for the financial institution as a whole. Banks also have a written information security 
policy, sound security policy guidelines, and well-designed system architecture, as well 
as provide for physical security, employee education, and testing, as part of an effective 
program (FDIC FIL 68-99 , 1999). The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
issued this guidance in 1999 after the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) was enacted and 
passed through Congress. Furthermore, the FDIC announced in June of 2003 that it was 
revising the compliance examination process to focus increased attention on an 
institution's compliance management system (FDIC FIL 81-05, 2005). Neither of these 
Financial Institution Letters (FIL’s) from the FDIC provides any direction on how to 
complete an information technology RA. Neither piece of guidance outlines a repeatable 
management process to follow to identify threats and make compensating control 
decisions. Therefore, financial institutions are left to their own devices in figuring out 
how to conduct a thorough and accurate information technology RA. This becomes very 
problematic at SMFIs as they typically do not have an information technology individual 
on staff, let alone an information security professional who is educated and current on 
information security threats, trends and countermeasures related to the banking industry 
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(Podhradsky, 2009).  
 
1.2 Problem Definition  
  Financial institutions, of all sizes, are required to conduct a risk assessment (RA) 
every year by the FDIC.   Large financial institutions, which are typically billions in 
financial assets, have different abilities and needs compared to smaller financial 
institutions which are typically millions in financial assets. However, according to the 
FDIC, both institution sizes have the same regulations and requirements for risk 
management. There are five specific problems this research aims to answer, which are the 
following. 
1. Different size financial institutions have different resources available 
to protect IT assets in terms of financial, staffing and time.  
2. Current RA practices are done to appease regulators, and not to add 
value to help make decisions. 
3. Little guidance is given to financial institutions by the FDIC on how 
to conduct a RA. 
4. Generic RA models require a high level of understanding that is 
usually not found in small to medium sized financial institutions. 
5. Generic RA models available are mostly either asset or 
organizational based, not both.  SMFIs need a RA that addresses 
both areas.  
 Large and small financial institutions have the same FDIC regulation but 
different resources available in terms of IT staffing, IT budgets, and overall security 
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needs yet overall the FDIC regulations are written in a one-size-fits-all environment.  
           Small and Medium Sized Financial Institutions (SMFIs) understand they are 
required by the FDIC to conduct a RA, and they typically approach this process in a 
manner to appease regulators.  The RA process that SMFIs take does not typically result 
in an accurate RA or add value to their organization (Streff, 2007).  RAs for SMFIs need 
to identify assets and service providers, outline the risk with each asset, list the 
countermeasures applied to each asset and demonstrate how effective their current 
mitigating approach is in reducing the risk to the financial institution (Podhradsky, 2009).   
However, a majority of SMFIs handle the RA process in a completely different fashion 
where bankers pass around an Excel spreadsheet and various people throughout the bank 
list assets and the approach taken to secure the device (Streff, 2007).  This process not 
only results in a grossly inaccurate RA, but it also adds no value to the organization.  
When organizations conduct RA’s in this manner, they are only completing this 
assessment to conciliate government FDIC regulation, and not using it as a tool for their 
overall risk management process (Streff, 2007).  
  SMFIs cannot be held solely accountable for the understated RA process. With 
little guidance from the FDIC, they are approaching the RA process with the same regard 
as the FDIC.  If the FDIC demanded tighter regulations and an accurate assessment, 
financial institutions would have no choice but to follow suit. 
 Generic RA models have been developed and deployed across several industries, 
including banking; however generic RA models assume a high level of understanding 
about banking assets, risks, threats, risk mitigation, and information security policy which 
is typically found in larger financial institutions.  This type of advanced knowledge is 
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usually not found in management (Gautam, 1989). SMFIs need a different approach to 
solving their information security RA process than their larger financial institutions 
counterparts.  The generic models implemented by larger financial institutions are not 
applicable to smaller institutions, due to their IT staffing, IT budget, and IT security 
limitations.  A RA model for a SMFI should also include both an asset and organizational 
assessment (Streff, 2007).  Larger financial organizations have the financial and staffing 
resources to conduct both an asset and organizational based assessment, however SMFIs 
need to incorporate both assessments into one single assessment (Streff, 2007).  
 
1.3 Objectives and Approach  
 The objectives for this research are to address the five challenges of facing SMFIs 
when conducting a RA outlined in secion1.2.  An RA model for SMFIs needs to address 
FDIC regulations, IT staffing limitations, financial resource restrictions, knowledge 
limitations, assets and the organization, all while being tailored towards the banking 
industry.  The new RA model, Small to Medium Entity Risk Assessment Model, 
SMERAM, works to address the unique needs of SMFIs.  
The first problem SMERAM aims to address is problem 1, different size financial 
institutions have different resources available to protect IT assets. IT staffing limitations 
are met with SMERAM as financial institutions do not need a dedicated IT department or 
staff member on-site to complete the RA.  Risk management is a management 
responsibility and a member of the management team can conduct the RA (Streff, 2007).  
SMERAM has been specifically created to be completed by both technical and non-
technical personnel.  Other Generic RA models require a certified consultant or full time 
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IT staff to complete the RA, while SMERAM does not.  This unique characteristic of 
SMERAM reduces the cost of implementation and maintenance which is not typically 
seen in other generic RA models.    
The smaller IT budgets associated with SMFIs are also factored into SMERAM.  
Most generic RA models such as ISO, NIST, or COBIT require a certified consultant or 
IT staff to complete the RA, while SMERAM does not, which results in reduced costs for 
completing a valid and value added RA.   An ISO certification for example, costs 
upwards of $50,000 for a medium sized institution; this is well beyond the reach of most 
SMFIs (Martin, 2002).  Also, SMERAM does not have any subscription costs associated 
with its implementation, which is unlike other generic RA models.  
The second problem outlined in 1.2 that SMERAM addresses is the current 
practices of conducting a RA in SMFIs.  Currently, the majority of SMFIs handle the 
FDIC regulated RA process in a manner that appeases regulators, not in a fashion that 
helps the financial institution add value to their organization. SMERAM is designed to 
show the financial institution what IT assets they have, what threats are associated with 
those assets, and how mitigating practices can reduce the risk their IT assets impose. 
From this information, the SMFI can determine what steps should be taken to further 
secure their organization. 
The third problem as outlined in 1.2 that SMERAM aims to address is that little 
guidance is given to SMFIs by the FDIC. SMERAM meets FDIC FIL guidelines as it is 
designed for the RA to be completed every year, and reviewed on an ongoing basis. 
SMERAM encourages SMFIs to update their RA whenever there is a major change in 
their network or information technology infrastructure, which keeps the RA an adaptive 
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and living part of the information security program. This approach not only adds value to 
the organization as it helps the financial institution identify and outline their current 
security posture and allows them make informed decisions regarding their information 
technology purchases and upgrades but also meets FDIC regulatory standards. 
The fourth problem that SMERAM addresses is the knowledge limitations found 
in SMFIs when dealing with information technology security.  The FDIC states that risk 
management is a management responsibility, as a result, the management teams in SMFIs 
need to conduct the annual RA.  In order to do this properly, the SMFI management team 
will need assistance in assets, threats, and controls.  Appendixes C, F, and E, 
respectively, have this information for typical SMFIs.  
The fifth problem SMERAM aims to address is most generic RA models are 
either asset or organizational based, not both. SMERAM further adds value to the 
financial institution as it completes both an asset and organizational RA.  Not all generic 
RA models evaluate security in both an asset and organizational level as SMERAM does. 
This approach saves time and money for SMFIs as only one RA has to be completed.  
The unique needs of SMFIs are documented in Table 1, Generic Models vs 
SMERAM.   
Table 1 Generic Models vs SMERAM 
SMFI Needs Generic Models SMERAM 
FDIC Federal 
Institution Letters 
Not defined to 
financial 
organizations- 
applies to many 
Meets FDIC guidelines as it 
is honed specifically to the 
financial industry 
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industries 
IT Staff Usually needed, 
added cost 
Management Process- No 
additional staff required 
Credential 
Consultant needed 
Usually needed, 
added cost 
Management Process- No 
additional staff required 
Configured to 
banking industry 
No Assets/ Threats/ 
Countermeasures specific to 
banking industry 
Asset or 
Organizational  
Varies Both asset and organizational 
based RA are completed with 
SMERAM 
 
 
1.4 Methodology 
This research will utilize the design science research methodology, as an IT 
artifact will be created.  Hevner, et al. present the guidelines for design science research 
in the paper “Design Science in Information Systems Research” for validation and 
evaluation (Hevner, 2004). This research will employ each of the seven guidelines to 
provide a methodical evaluation of the research IT artifact.  
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 The artifacts shaped from this research include a risk assessment model for 
SMFIs.  This model will be created and evaluated with Design Science guidelines.  
 The seven guidelines outlined in the “Design Science in Information Systems 
Research” are listed in Table 2,  along with the definition and the approach SMERAM 
takes to meet the guidelines (Hevner, 2004). 
 
Table 2 Hevner Design Science Guidelines 
Guideline Description SMERAM 
1- Design as an 
Artifact 
Design-science research must 
produce a viable artifact in the 
form of a construct, a model, a 
method, or an instantiation 
The artifact, 
SMERAM,  is created 
in accordance of 
Design Science 
guidelines 
 
2- Problem 
Relevance 
The objective of design-
science research is to develop 
technology-based solutions to 
important, and relevant 
business problems 
SMERAM was 
designed to address the 
staffing and financial 
limitations of SMFIs 
all while meeting and 
exceeding FDIC FIL 
regulation 
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3- Design 
Evaluation 
The utility, quality, and 
efficacy of a design artifact 
must be rigorously 
demonstrated via well-
executed evaluation methods 
SMERAM was 
effectively tested and 
deployed in a 
community bank  
4- Research 
Contributions 
Effective design-science 
research must provide clear 
and verifiable contributions in 
the areas of the design artifact, 
design foundations, and/ 
design methodologies 
 
The SMERAM RA 
model for SMFIs is the 
contribution to the 
security and SMFI 
fields 
5- Research 
Rigor 
Design-science research relies 
upon the application of 
rigorous methods in both the 
construction and evaluation of 
the design artifact 
SMERAM was built 
on accepted generic 
RA models such as 
ISO, NIST, COBIT, 
and CORAS while 
being honed to the 
financial industry 
 
6- Design as a 
Search Process 
The search for an effective 
artifact requires utilization 
available means to reach 
SMERAM was 
developed through a 
prototype environment 
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desired ends while satisfying 
laws in the problem 
environment 
after studying various 
established generic RA 
models  
 
7- 
Communication 
of Research 
Design-science research must 
be presented effectively both 
to technology-orientated as 
well as management-
orientated audiences 
SMERAM is designed 
to be used effectively 
by both technical and 
non-technical 
personnel;  the 
intended audience is 
bank management 
 
  
 This research will also employ the qualitative research method approach of case 
study.  A single case study was conducted to test the effectiveness of SMERAM in a 
financial institution while addressing the unique needs of staffing and financial 
limitations.  Also, the overall quality of information technology assets along with the 
organization as a whole was evaluated.  
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2. Literature review 
2.1 Background 
Information technology is synonymous with responsibility in terms of daily 
processes, upkeep, and upgrading. However, none is more important than information 
security risk identification and mitigation. Although very little scientific research has 
been conducted in response to information system risk mitigation.    
The goal of this research is to define what a risk assessment is, support the 
audience in developing an in-depth understanding of the risk assessment process while 
emphasizing several seminal works pertaining to information technology risk assessment.  
Also, several current generic RA for assessing risk in technology systems will be 
discussed.  Ultimately, it is the intention of this research to demonstrate the importance of 
the information RA process and point out current gaps in the field in relation to generic 
RA models.  The research also produces a generic RA model that has been honed for the 
use in SMFIs, the model is Small to Medium Entity Risk Assessment Model 
(SMERAM).   Finally, this research will conclude with several suggestions for further 
research and development.  
The study and analysis of risk is a customary practice throughout several key 
industries such as insurance, medical, finance, economics along with many others.  The 
concept of studying, analyzing and scientifically outlining the risk assessment process 
explicitly for use in safeguarding information systems have traditionally been 
overshadowed in favor of more broadly applicable information security standards. 
 For the purpose of this research the definition of an information technology RA 
will be as follows: Risk assessments are the process of accurately and consistently 
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measuring threats, or the potential of threats with an information system (Streff, 2007). 
Streff outlines that risk based management means that major decisions that are made 
regarding information security analyze the impact a change will have in either increasing 
or decreasing the amount of risk there is to informational assets in the bank (Streff, 
2007).   
Historically, when attempting to conduct an RA, organizations have been left to 
sort through several weighty generic standards such as OCTAVE, CORAS, ISO, NIST, 
or COBIT, among others. Attempting to apply these generic standards across all 
industries, in an identical fashion, can make for a time consuming and frustrating 
experience, especially for SMFIs.  Many organizations, mostly smaller institutions, find 
that attempting to implement a generic standard fails to adequately implement the 
standard and as a result end up with throwing together parts of different standards, or 
worse, no standard at all.  By not implementing a scientific standard the company is 
opening themselves up to failure with their information security program, which puts 
their customer’s financial data in jeopardy (Streff, 2007). 
As businesses continue to grow and become more dependent on large information 
systems, managers and organizations must learn to effectively identify, and assess risks 
to these systems.  As pointed out in the article “Bayesian Probabilistic Risk Analysis” 
(Ali, 1985) the process of risk management includes identifying a system’s weakness as 
well as effectively reducing the probability of the particular system from being impacted 
by the exposed weakness.  Bayesian risk analyses were originally developed for use in 
the nuclear power industry.   
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A measurement of risk, according to Ali, can be determined by answering the following 
four fundamental questions (Ali, 1985);  
 What can go wrong?   
 How frequently can it be expected to happen?    
 What would be it consequences?   
 How certain are we about the answers to the first three questions (Ali, 
1985).  
Although the use of technology and the advancement of the RA process have 
drastically changed modern information system risk, the answers to these four questions 
can still provide a highly accurate and useful assessment of information system risk (Ali, 
1985). 
            Network intruders work tirelessly to develop the newest attacks patterns and 
processes to exploit vulnerabilities and gain unauthorized access to networks.  As a 
result, organizations need to vigilantly work to protect their information system assets by 
studying and learning the current attack processes (Myerson, 2002).  It is not enough for 
an organization to simply have a risk assessment process in place; your risk assessment 
must be an active and adaptive part of the entire information security program 
(Podhradsky, 2008).  This includes, but is not limited to, regularly updating the process to 
allow for flexibility in dealing with new threats and vulnerabilities (Myerson, 2002).  If a 
risk assessment is completed only once a year it is merely a snapshot of that point in 
time, and it cannot be used as a valid and honest representation of the institutions security 
posture.   Whereas an adaptive and updated risk assessment will change when your 
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network or systems changes, this entails updating your risk assessment at least quarterly, 
or whenever there is significant changes made to the network.  This method will result in 
an accurate information security risk assessment and current security posture for the 
institution.  
The ability to safely and accurately defend an information system depends upon 
completely understanding the threats associated with that information system and 
applying controls and commensurate with the defined level of risk.  This process of risk 
assessment helps organizations and managers appropriately spend time and money 
defending and protecting assets which need it most.  Ultimately risk assessment can be 
seen as a productivity tool that saves the organization time, money along with their 
reputation.  
 RA’s examine the impact and probability that threats pose to an information 
system.  A RA computes the probability of a specific threat taking place while also 
determining the impact of the specific threat. When organizations complete a risk 
assessment, they can begin to compute their risk level (Blakley, 2001).   
There are several common fundamental themes within varying RA’s.  For 
example, Woemer states that risk should be calculated as risk = impact x probability 
(Woerner, 2007). There are many different and widely used models to complete the 
actual risk assessment.  Some models are built into an automated tool, and some are 
completed on paper. In the paper “Applications of Qualitative Modeling to Knowledge-
Based Risk Assessment Studies”, Gautam, et al, the focus is on system failure to help 
identify risk (Gautam, 1989).  The authors showcase a qualitative modeling technique to 
augment the RA process to assist in the design of an RA automated tool.   
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           Gautam et al believe that the mutual use of a knowledge based system and 
qualitative problem solving can result in the development of a generic RA tool.  They 
further state that by designing a generic tool, it can be widely implemented across several 
industries (Gautam, 1989).  The issue with this approach within SMFIs is that by using a 
generic tool, the process is not unique to any one industry.  In order to complete an 
accurate RA one would have to have all of the information about the information systems 
within the organization.  Whereas with a tool or model that is designed for the specific 
audience there is a more user-friendly environment to complete the RA process.  
Depending on the industry there are very specific information systems; banking, ethanol, 
hospitals and education all have specific information systems tailored to their venue.  A 
generic tool would require much more time and resources to complete than a model or 
tool that is tailored and designed for the industry. For SMFIs to use a generic tool they 
would have to first have the understanding of the information systems in within their 
organization and second have the manpower to use the tool, however they typically have 
limited resources on both fronts.    
           Organizations are continuing to lean on information systems for all aspect of their 
business, and they need to understand the risk associated with their business systems.  
Conducting a risk assessment will show the organization how to adequately protect their 
information and business assets.  
One of the primary advantages of developing a knowledge based system using 
fault tree analysis is that it provides for an excellent tool to model “what-if” scenarios.  
By examining the potential system failures organizations and managers can get a broad 
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and accurate picture of potential risk.  The organization would then have a clear picture 
as to where to invest their information security dollars (Streff, 2008).   
Bob Blakley, Ellen McDermott and Dan Geer discuss the process of measuring 
risk through the concept of Annualized Loss Expectation. (Blakley et al., 2001)  
Annualized Loss Expectation helps to quantify risk in terms of a financial definition 
where companies predict a specific value or cost associated with the occurrence of a 
particular risk.  Using this model, an organization calculates risk by multiplying a 
specific dollar amount against the probability of the risk’s occurrence.  Cost is estimated 
by totaling both the direct and indirect dollar amounts, over the course of one year, which 
are related to the occurrence of the risk.  Examples of direct and indirect dollar amounts 
include physical damage, equipment replacement, labor costs to repair, decreased 
employee productivity, lost sales, reputation damage, and legal costs.   Probability is 
determined by weighing the likelihood of a risk event on a 1 to “x” scale.  This 
probability is then multiplied by the cost associated with the annual loss resulting in a 
final dollar value which is representative of risk for the particular system.  
For example, the cost of a hacker defacing a company website is determined to be 
$2,000,000 while the probability of a hacker defacing the company’s website is 
determined to be 1 in 15,000, the ALE measurement would be ($2,000,000 x 1/15,000 = 
$133) 
Others have taken a different approach to defining the risk assessment process.  
Ye, et al, presented a six step approach to tackling risk assessment. (Ye, Barry, & Betsy, 
2006)  Their workflow begins with identifying a cost factor rating system.  Once the 
rating system has been defined, risks are identified.  Next the step is assigning risk 
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probability, this is followed by analyzing risk impact, at this point an overall risk can be 
normalized on a scale from 1-100.  The scale of 1-100 can then be disseminated into the 
following categories.  Systems with an overall risk from: 
 0-5 are considered “low risk”,  
 5-15 are marked as “moderate risk”,  
 15-50 are said to be “high risk” while  
 50-100 should be labeled as “very high risk”. (Ye et al., 2006).    
The final step is to offer ways of reducing the presented risk.  While Ye et. al., offer a 
systematic approach for the RA process, SMEFI’s would find the approach daunting and 
un manageable for their IT RA.  The result would be inaccurate RA results, which would 
result in the wrong protection profile be adapted for the SMEFI.  This would put 
customers financial information in jeopardy.  
Organizations often make the assumption that increased budgeting and spending 
on security investments will lead to a direct decrease in overall information system risk. 
This thinking is clearly demonstrated in the article “A model for evaluating IT Security 
Investments” (Cavusoglu, Mishra, & Raghunathan, 2004).  The level of risk obtained 
from an organization’s completed RA often determines the organization’s willingness to 
invest in appropriate security controls.  This type of organizational philosophy is another 
reason demonstrating the importance of an appropriate and accurate risk assessment, 
there are clear implications to an organizations financial health and bottom line.     
Along this same line of thought, Hamdi and Boudriga (Hamdi & Boudriga, 2003) 
explain that the process of assessing risk is often too difficult to perform accurately 
without the use of automated software.  Because of the complexity involved in accurate 
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RA, they argue there is a need for the creation of an automated system.  According to 
Hamdi & Boudriga, the tool must ultimately assist in security decisions.   Furthermore 
the authors point out that risk assessment can be sub-divided into two categories.  
Qualitative risk assessment expresses risk in subjective terminology while quantitative 
risk assessment attempts to assign values associated with the occurrence of a particular 
threat or risk.   
            
2.2 Disastrous Results from Under-valuing the Risk Assessment Process 
 The result of undervaluing the RA process and not having proper documentation 
can lead to devastating results. Organizations, whether non-profit or for profit, that have a 
data breach face much more than monetary losses, a hit to their reputation also occurs.  
Table XX below is an overview of large data breaches that may have been avoided if 
proper controls were enacted to secure their data.   
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Table 3 Historic Data Breaches 
Historic Data Breaches 
Year Company Number of Accounts 
Compromised 
2006 Veterans Administration 26.5 million plus 
2007 TJX Enterprises 100 million 
2008 Heartland Payment 
Systems / Hannaford 
Payment Systems 
130 million 
   
An example of this pressing issue is the Veterans Administrations who had a 
laptop stolen that contained confidential records of over 26.5 million retired veterans 
(Burger, 2006).  The laptop was stolen from the home of a Veterans Affairs employee 
and resulted in the largest security breach in the history of the United States Government 
(Burger, 2006).  It is important to note that this was not the result of a hacker or script 
kiddy but rather the result of simple human error and physical security issues (Burger, 
2006).    Proper documentation and a risk assessment process should have prevented the 
employee from leaving the government office with such a valuable asset.  Further 
documentation should have mandated that storing that type of secure data on a portable 
device is prohibited (Burger, 2006).  Information which is considered secure in nature, 
such as personal identifying information, belongs on a server, with proper credentials 
used to access the information.  
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For an organization to defend an information system they must have an 
understanding of the risk associated with the asset along with the knowledge for applying 
the appropriate controls to mitigate risk.  This aspect of the RA process assists an 
organization in appropriately using resources to defend and protect organizational assets 
and data.  Ultimately RA’s can be seen as a productivity tool that saves the organization 
time, money, and reputation, which would have served the department of Veteran Affairs 
a substantial amount of money, time, resources, and a hit to their reputation (Burger, 
2006).  
 TJX Enterprises had one of the largest data breaches ever recorded. A TJX 
insider, requesting anonymity had the following to say about the infamous security 
breach that affected over 100 million accounts (Dawson, 2007): 
 
"Poorly secured in-store computer kiosks are at least partly 
to blame for acting as gateways to the company's IT systems, 
the kiosks, located in many of TJX's retail stores, let people 
apply for jobs electronically but also allowed direct access 
to the company's network, as they weren't protected by 
firewalls. 'The people who started the breach opened up the 
back of those terminals and used USB drives to load 
software onto those terminals,' says the source. In a March 
filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission, TJX 
acknowledged finding 'suspicious software' on its computer 
systems. (Dawson, 2007)" 
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The TJX data breach, which affected over 100 million credit card accounts, was 
discovered in 2007 (PrivacyRights, 2009).   TJX lost not only money, but also credibility  
 
due to their inadequate information security policies.  Hackers gained access to the credit 
and debit card sever that house millions of card numbers.  In addition to the credit card 
numbers, names, addresses, social security numbers and drivers license numbers were 
also stolen from TJX (Dawson, 2007).  This type of personal information is what hackers 
look to steal when they are trying to steal an identity (Streff, 2006).      
Heartland, another example of a data breach involving credit / debit card fraud 
occurred in 2008. Heartland payment systems processes over 100 million transactions 
Figure 1- Types of Fraud / Security Breaches 
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each month, as a result of that magnitude of data crossing their lines, it was very difficult 
to be able to identify the amount of data compromised due to inadequate security.  At last 
count, the Heartland data breach affected over 130 million records when combined with 
the Hannaford breach (Chronology of Data Breaches, 2009).    
According to Barnett Insurance agency, in 2008 credit card fraud accounts for 
over 28% of reported security breaches and fraud reports. The banking sector had 18% of 
reported security breaches, which means that overall the financial sector is accountable 
for over 56% of all security data breaches and fraud reports  This is indicated in Figure 1, 
Types of Fraud / Security Breaches.   
 Data Breaches, which are a direct result of inadequate security, can be reduced 
when a proper RA is completed (Data Security Breach Statistics, 2009).  The RA process 
identifies risk associated with information technology assets, which demonstrates the 
security level of each asset (Streff, 2007).   When organizations fail to properly secure 
each information technology asset the results can be disastrous.    Figures 2, 3, and 4 
below depict the amount of records comprised in 2006, 2007, and 2008 respectively as a 
result of a data breach (Data Security Breach Statistics, 2009). 
 In 2006, theft was the overall leader in records compromised followed malicious 
insiders, carless/ untrained insider, hacking and 3
rd
 party service providers followed (Data 
Security Breach Statistics, 2009).    Theft accounted for over 35,000,000 breached 
records.  Theft, which is part of physical security, should be a part of any RA process.  
Controls should also be in place for malicious insiders, hacking and 3
rd
 party service 
providers which are all part of an overall RA process. 
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Figure 1 Records Compromised by Breach Source-2006 
 
In 2007, hacking was the overall leader in records compromised followed by 
malicious insiders, theft, carless/ untrained insider, 3
rd
 party service providers followed 
worms and viruses (Data Security Breach Statistics, 2009).    Hacking accounted for over 
100,000,000 breached records.   
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Figure 2 Records Compromised by Breach Source- 2007 
 
In 2008, similar to 2007, hacking was the overall leader in records compromised 
followed by malicious insiders, theft, carless/ untrained insider,  and 3
rd
 party service 
providers (Data Security Breach Statistics, 2009).    Hacking accounted for over 
180,000,000 breached records.   
26 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Records Compromised by Breach Source- 2008 
 
 
Over 2006, 2007, and 2008 hacking, malicious insiders, theft, and careless or 
untrained insiders resulted in billions of compromised accounts (Data Security Breach 
Statistics, 2009).  These compromised accounts can contain personal identifying 
information such as SSN’s, names, addresses, date of birth that is used to steal identities 
(Podhradsky, 2008).  By have a valid and defined RA in process, the number of 
compromised records will naturally decrease. RA assess the overall risk with an asset and 
demonstrate where security resources should be allocated (Streff, 2007).   
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2.3 Regulation  
 The financial industry is a highly regulated environment due to the financial and 
personal information that is stored at many financial institutions.  This information has an 
inherent attraction to identity thieves. Table 4, Regulation for Financial Institutions, 
outlines the major regulation that governs financial institutions, whether small or large.  
Table 4 Regulation for Financial Institutions 
Regulation Purpose or Intent 
FDIC FIL 68-99 FDIC FIL 68-99 states banks should have a 
written information security policy, sounds 
security policy guidelines, and well-designed 
system architecture, as part of an overall 
security policy.  However, it does not state 
how to conduct a RA, or with what 
methodology.  Available in Appendix A. 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
(GLBA) 
Requires all financial institutions to conduct 
an information security RA to identify risk to 
non-public customer information. Available in 
Appendix C. 
FDIC FIL 81-05 FDIC 81-05 was written to focus more 
attention on the RA process and information 
security program for information technology 
assets.  However, there still isn’t a repeatable 
management process listed for the RA 
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process.  Available in Appendix B. 
 
 
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999 requires all financial institutions 
to conduct an information technology risk assessment to identify security risks to non-
public customer information (The Gramm-Leach Bliley Act, 1999). Small and medium-
sized financial institutions struggle with this important exercise and often do not 
understand how to adequately integrate the act into their banking practices. Therefore, 
community banks, credit unions and other small and medium-sized financial institutions 
do not have a good understanding of what represents real information security risk to 
their financial institution, and what mitigating countermeasures should be deployed.  
The RA process provides a framework for establishing policy guidelines and 
identifying the risk assessment tools and practices that may be appropriate for an 
institution (Streff, 2007). According to the FDIC banks should have a written information 
security policy, sound security policy guidelines, and well-designed system architecture, 
as well as provide for physical security, employee education, and testing, as part of an 
effective program (FDIC FIL 68-99 , 1999). The FDIC issued this guidance in 1999 after 
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley ACT was passed. Further, The FDIC announced in June of 
2003 that it was revising the compliance examination process to focus increased attention 
on an institution's compliance management system (FDIC FIL 81-05, 2005).   
Together these two pieces of regulation are the sole guidelines from the FDIC and 
can be found in the appendix A and appendix B respectively of this paper.  Neither of 
these two Financial Institution Letters from the FDIC provides any direction on how to 
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complete an information technology RA. Nor does either piece of guidance outline a 
repeatable management process to follow to identify threats and make compensating 
control decisions. Therefore, small and medium sized financial institutions are left to 
their own devices in figuring out how to conduct a thorough, accurate information 
technology risk assessment. This becomes very problematic at small and medium sized 
financial institutions as they typically do not have an information technology individual 
on staff, let alone an information security professional who is educated and current on 
information security threats, trends and countermeasures.  
 In August of 2005, the FDIC updated the procedures and processes for member 
banks to include a risk-focused examination concentrating on the area of information 
technology for 3
rd
 party entities. This was the first update to their Financial Institution 
Letters that dealt specifically with information security in nearly 8 years; to date, there 
have not been any other updates.  
  The highlights of the 2003 FIL focused on member banks implementing an 
information security program as well as asking financial institutions to define a process 
for securing information assets (FDIC FIL 81-05, 2005).  The FDIC’s new Information 
Technology Risk Management Program (IT-RMP) applied universally to all FDIC 
Insured banks despite their level of technology or the size of the financial institution.  As 
outlined in the FIL-81-2005 (FDIC FIL 81-05, 2005). The process of conducting a 
technology focused risk assessment is specifically listed as a requirement for compliance 
with the IT-RMP  FDIC FIL 81-05 can be found in Appendix A. 
 The FDIC stopped short of spelling out the specific details for “how to” conduct 
an information system risk assessment, rather they choose to let each institution follow its 
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own path for assessing risk. There is also no guidance on the use of an automated tool to 
aid in their assessment process. This causes serious issues to SMFIs due to their limited 
knowledge and resources to conduct a viable risk assessment.  
 
2.5 Generic Risk Assessment Models  
 National Institute of Standards and Technology 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology, NIST, attempt’s to promote 
guidance for development of technical standards and processes.  In July of 2002, NIST 
introduced a special publication directed towards the development of risk management 
for information technology systems.  In the publication, NIST outlines and defines the 
process of risk assessment as not only a key component to securing information systems 
but also clearly states that the process is a management responsibility (Stoneburner, 
2002).  This new framework suggests that technology risk assessments should be 
conducted by an organization’s management team, and not necessarily its technical 
support staff.     
 Similar to the FDIC, NIST defines risk assessment as the first step of an overall 
risk management plan.  NIST incorporates the RA process into the system development 
life cycle (SDLC).  NIST defines risk assessment as “the likelihood of a given threat-
source’s exercising a particular potential vulnerability and the resulting impact of that 
adverse event on the organization” (Stoneburner, 2002).  In order to accurately assign a 
risk rating, NIST states that an organization must measure both probability and impact 
(Stoneburner, 2002).  Determining the probability measurement requires an organization 
to examine their unique vulnerabilities, particular threats, and individual controls for each 
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system.  In order to assign and produce an impact score, the organization must rate the 
criticality and sensitivity of each system. Specifically, NIST describes 9 primary steps in 
the risk assessment process which are outlined in Table 5, NIST Risk Assessment Model  
(Stoneburner, 2002).    
 
 
Table 5 NIST 
NIST Step Description 
1- System Characterization Characterization of the IT system being 
analyzes along with the current security and 
system boundary 
2- Threat Identification A threat statement containing an overview of 
threat sources that could compromise system 
vulnerabilities 
3- Vulnerability 
Identification 
A overview of system vulnerabilities that be 
leveraged by potential threat sources listed in 
step 2 
4- Control Analysis A overview of current or future controls 
implemented on IT systems to mitigate 
potential vulnerabilities and reduce the 
impact of any successfully compromised 
vulnerabilities  
5- Likelihood Likelihood rating, such as high, medium and 
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Determination low 
6- Impact Analysis A range of high, medium and low applied to 
an impact 
7- Risk Determination The risk level in terms of high, medium or 
low  
8- Control 
Recommendations 
Control recommendations and other 
alternative solutions to mitigate risk  
9- Results Documentation The risk assessment report which includes 
threats, and counteracting vulnerabilities.  
Also risk measurements and 
recommendations for further control 
implementation  
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Figure 4 NIST RA STEPS 
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International Standards Organizations (ISO) 
 The International Standards Organization, ISO, has developed a risk assessment 
process that is outlined in Table 6, ISO Risk Assessment Model.   
 
Table 6 ISO Risk Assessment Model 
ISO Step Description 
Security Policy The security policy of the 
organization is both created and 
evaluated.    An example is the 
organizations password policy.  
Organizational Security Security at the organization level, 
not just the system or asset level.  
Examples are a business continuity 
plan and Information Security 
Programs.  
Asset Classification and  
   Control 
Assets are classified depending on 
their security needs. An example is 
assigning ownership for business 
assets.  
Personnel Security The security risk from people is 
evaluated and calculated. An 
examples is non-disclosure 
agreements with new employees.  
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Physical and Environmental  
   Security 
The security of assets and the 
organization is evaluated at the 
physical level. An example is 
access control to a server room 
using keys or biometrics. 
Communications and  
   Operations Management 
Used to ensure the correct and 
secure operation of information 
processing facilities. Examples are 
backup policies and documentation 
of business plans.  
Access Control Access control is established for 
assets based on personnel needs. 
An example is allowing only 
specific personnel access to 
information technology assets such 
as network shares or routers.  
Systems Development Software development creates and 
assigns ownership to information 
systems.  An example is controlling 
software code during the software 
development lifecycle.  
Business Continuity The creation and validation of a 
practiced plan for how an 
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organization will recover after a 
natural or man-made disruption. 
Developing, testing, and training on 
the Business Continuity plan is 
essential for reduced downtime.  
An example is the Y2K scare that 
occurred in the late 90’s; businesses 
worked to protect their information 
technology assets.  
 
 The ISO standard is often referred to as a “mile wide, and inch deep (Quality 
Management Cocktail: ISO, Lean, Six Sigma)”. The ISO standards cover many topics, 
but none in depth.  This results in confusion on the best way to adequately protect 
information security assets by conducting a risk assessment.  
The ISO standard is often referred to as “a mile wide and an inch deep 
(Westguard, 2005).” ISO lacks in the area of asset management; the standard tells you to 
inventory your assets but does not lay out a recommended process.  The lack of concern 
of asset management is a valid concern of ISO.  Many data breaches are a direct result to 
the lack proper asset management, the VA is a fantastic example of what the lack of asset 
management can result it.  The VA had over 26.5 million records compromised due to 
inadequate asset management.  (A Chronology of Data Breaches). With such a high rate 
of data breached related to the loss of assets, not having my information related to asset 
management within the ISO standard is a great concern.  
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The access control section of the ISO model includes a great section on including 
mobile technology. This is important because in addition to physical access to mobile 
technology, regular access is needed. Another area of concern would by cryptography.  
The ISO standard does not have any significant reference to cryptography, the CISSP 
standard has cryptography as its own domain which is outlined in over 100 pages (Peltier, 
2005). Also there is little discussion on wireless access. With wireless access becoming 
more prevalent every day with lack of consideration on wireless standards is also a 
concern.   
 
Cost of Risk Assessment Software (CORAS)  
CORAS is a standard developed by a consortium of European Union members in 
an effort to improve and streamline the RA process.   CORAS has a strong emphasis on 
maintaining the “confidentiality, integrity, availability and non-repudiation, 
accountability, authenticity, and reliability of IT systems (Siv-Hilde Houmb)”.  CORAS 
works toward considerations for both human operators and the information systems.  The 
CORAS framework relies greatly on the use of modeling to provide the risk assessment.  
The methodology has implemented Unified Modeling Language (UML) along with 
diagrams to define associations.    The CORAS framework is a 4 part series as 
demonstrated in Table 7, CORAS Risk Assessment Framework.  
 
 
 
 
 
38 
 
 
 
Table 7 CORAS 
CORAS Steps Description 
System Risk Documentation  Risks that are associated with 
specific assets are documented and 
categorized.  
Risk Management Process Integrates risk management 
practices into the overall RA 
process.  This includes 
confidentiality, integrity, 
availability and non-repudiation, 
accountability, authenticity, and 
reliability of IT systems.   
Risk Integration and  
Developmental Process 
Risk analysis is tightly integrated 
into a UML and RM-ODP setting 
Tool Integration  The CORAS RA process involves 
integrating a predefined tool into 
the RA process.  The tool has been 
developed by the CORAS 
development team.  
 
 
 One of the unique characteristics of this type of risk assessment is that it 
combines different aspects from several types of risk assessments (Siv-Hilde Houmb).      
(Eheo Dimitrakos)                                 
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Figure 5 CORAS Methodology 
 
 
Control Objectives for Information and related Technology 
The Control Objectives for Information and related Technology (COBIT) is a risk 
assessment framework developed by the Information Systems Audit and Control 
Association (ISACA), and is outlined in Table 8, COBIT Risk Assessment Framework.  
COBIT , an IT governance framework, is a supporting toolset that allows upper 
management to bridge the gap between technical issues, control requirements, and 
business risks. COBIT lays the foundation for clear policy development and good practice 
policy for information systems throughout the entire organizations. COBIT emphasizes 
the importance for regulatory compliance, regardless of industry, and assists the 
organization in increasing the value derived from information technology systems 
(ISACA).  
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Table 8 COBIT 
COBIT Step Description 
Plan and Organize  Defines a strategic IT plan and 
direction which includes 
information architecture, 
technological direction, IT 
Processes, organization and 
relationships related to IT.   
Acquire and Implement  This step involves identifying 
current IT requirements, acquiring 
the appropriate technology, and 
integrating it throughout the 
organizations business processes. 
This step also includes the creation 
of a maintenance plan that 
organizations should implement in 
order to extend the life of an IT 
system and its components.  
Deliver and Support  This step focuses on the delivery 
aspects of the information system.  
Execution of applications and 
results of execution are included in 
this step. This step includes security 
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issues and training.  
Monitor & Evaluate A company’s overall strategy in 
assessing the unique needs of the 
organization and effectiveness of 
the current IT system is evaluated.  
The organization needs to determine 
if the initial purpose for purchasing 
the IT asset has been meet and if it 
meets the objectives for which it 
was designed.  The asset also needs 
to evaluate the controls necessary to 
comply with regulatory 
requirements 
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Figure 6 COBIT Framework 
 
 
 
COBIT also attempts to account for some “human” risk by asking the assessment 
process to include questions about job satisfaction, potential lay-offs, and attitudes 
towards ethics. Including this part in the RA process is important, because human error 
accounts for the majority of data breaches (Chronology of Data Breaches, 2009).   
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Operationally Critical, Threat, Asset and Vulnerability Evaluation
 
(OCTAVE) 
Finally, OCTAVE is a risk analysis approach which attempts to define 
information system risk by evaluating the risk based on four elements; asset, threat, 
impact and vulnerability (Alberts, 2002).  OCTAVE was created at Carnegie Mellon 
University in conjunction with the Software Engineering Institute.  The OCTAVE Risk 
Assessment framework is outlined in Table X, OCTAVE Risk Assessment Framework.   
  
 
Table 9 OCTAVE 
OCTAVE Step Description 
Asset  The organization determines the 
information technology assets they 
have.  
Threat  The organization determines the 
threats that are inherent to each 
information technology asset. Threats 
include man made or natural 
disasters.  
Impact  The organization determines the 
chances each threat has of occurring.  
For example, if the organization is in 
the Midwest, there is a low chance of 
a typhoon hitting the organization.  
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Vulnerability Evaluation The organization determines how 
vulnerable their information systems 
are and they rank them in the order 
controls should be applied. 
 
 
With OCTAVE, the first step in managing risk is to understand what the risks are 
for the organization's key assets.   The organization’s mission statement is also analyzed 
in relation to the risk assessment process, meaning that mission critical assets are 
protected more than non mission critical assets.  Once assets are identified, organizational 
personnel can draft plans to mitigate the inherent risks that will have the highest impact 
on the organization's assets (Dorofee).  
 OCTAVE’S four steps;  Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation outline the 
essential steps in a systematic, comprehensive, context-driven information security risk 
assessment  (Dorofee). When implementing the OCTAVE RA, an organization can make 
information-protection decisions based on risks to the confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of critical information technology assets (OCTAVE Information).  
 Organizations that implement the OCTAVE RA model include the United States 
Department of Defense as well as the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) of 
the United Kingdome Ministry of Defense. In addition to these notable organizations 
others include those in health care as OCTAVE supports HIPPA compliance, insurance, 
and many others (OCTAVE Information).  
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Figure 7 OCTAVE Framework 
 
 
  
As demonstrated in the preceding section, completing an accurate risk assessment 
is both valuable and necessary for an organization and its ability to properly protect their 
information systems.  Upon completion of the RA process the organization and 
management staff will be ready to make informed decisions with regard to budgeting, 
staffing and resource management.  A well defined RA leads to a deeper and more 
complete understand of both the overall level of risk associated with the implemented 
technology as well as the risks associated with each individual system along with the 
organization.  
 Generic Risk Assessment Models available for deployment in financial 
institutions are many; the highlighted models are ISO, NIST, COBIT, OCTAVE, and 
CORAS.  These models are heavily adopted into many large industries including large 
financial institutions. While these models provide a highly accurate RA model for these 
organizations, they are not as adaptable to smaller financial institutions.  Small to 
Octave
Asset
Threat
Impact
Vulnerability
Evaluatoin
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medium sized financial institutions have unique needs in terms of financial resources, 
staffing resources, an overall ability to implement a large generic RA mode that is not 
honed to their institution (Podhradsky, 2009).  
As demonstrated in the preceding sections, completing an accurate risk 
assessment is both valuable and necessary for an organization and its ability to properly 
protect their information system assets.  Upon completion of the risk assessment process 
the organization and management staff will be ready to make precise and informed 
decisions with regard to budgeting, staffing and resource management.  A well defined 
risk assessment leads to a deeper and more complete understand of both the overall level 
of risk associated with the implemented technology as well as the risks associated with 
each individual system. 
 Blakley, McDermott and Geer (2002) suggest that an organization has four 
options when addressing each risk.  The first option for managing risk is “Liability 
Transfer”.  This occurs when a business is able to convey the risk to another party outside 
of the organization, effectively removing the responsibility or accountability for the 
particular risk.  Most often this is accomplished through use of a disclaimer or other type 
of binding agreement.  A second option for addressing risk is through “Indemnification”.  
Indemnifying risks is effectively insuring the organization against the occurrence of a 
particular risk.  The third option identified by Blakely et. al, is “Mitigation”.  This is the 
process of reducing identified risks through procedure, processes, or controls.  It is 
important to note that mitigation can be used to specifically reduced the impact, 
probability, or both impact and probability of a risk.  The final option for addressing risk 
is “Retention”.  This is essentially an organization’s acceptance of a given risk.  The 
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specific risk is acknowledged and documented during the risk assessment process but no 
further steps are taken to reduce the current level of risk.  This path is typically chosen 
when the probability or impact of a risk occurring are very small.  Retention is also a 
viable option when the “return on risk reduction spending” does not produce a 
meaningful return. 
  
2. 5 Evaluation of Risk Assessment Models 
The process of comparing and evaluating various generic RA models is outlined 
In the paper “A Framework for Comparing Different Information Security Risk Analysis 
Methodologies.”  This framework aims to provide organizations with guidance in 
selecting a suitable RA model.  While the overall goal of identifying and classifying risk 
remains consistent across organizations, each may have different needs and requirements 
when it comes to assessing risk (Labuschagne, 2005).When attempting to choose a 
methodology Benoit recommends comparing the various approaches by answering five 
distinct questions, which are outlined in Table 10, Labuschagne Risk Assessment 
Evaluation.  
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Table 10 Labuschagne Risk Assessment Evaluation 
Labuschagne Risk Assessment Evaluation 
 
Will the risk assessment is completed by examining one asset at 
time or if several assets are grouped together to assess risk 
 
Where in the methodology is risk analysis done?  Due to various 
models requiring different degrees of information, the answer to 
this question will give an organization the ability to differentiate 
between preparation time and the overall accuracy of a risk 
assessment 
 
Who will complete the risk assessment?  Some risk assessments 
will be completed by internal personal while others rely 
extensively on experts who are external to the organization 
 
What formulas are used to calculate risk 
 
Is the output is relative or absolute?  As an example of this is 
some RA’s may have a value of “high” while others will 
compute a specific number 
 
 
49 
 
 
 
When attempting to choose a methodology Vorster and Labuschagne suggest 
comparing the various approaches by answering five distinct questions, which are the 
following: 
1. “Does the risk assessment examine risk to each asset individually, or 
does it group assets?”  The first question seeks to determine whether the 
RA is completed by examining one asset at time or if several assets are 
grouped together to assess risk.   This is important for assessing the 
overall risk of the information system assets. 
To determine if the RA conducts the analysis on a single asset or group 
of asset the research can review the final results.  If the result of the 
analysis if the results review each assets, then the RA is based on a single 
asset, however if the results group assets into systems or profiles the RA 
is based on a group of assets.   
If the organization employing the methodology prefers a quicker 
analysis, than the organization should adopt an RA model that completes 
the analysis on a group of assets.  
Scale of Criteria: 
 1- Indicates that the risk analysis is completed on an individual 
asset 
     2- Indicates that the risk analysis is completed on a group of 
assets 
2.  “Where in the methodology is risk analysis done?”  Various RA models 
require different degrees of information, the answer to this question will 
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allow an organization to differentiate between preparation time and the 
overall accuracy of a risk assessment.   
The time invested to complete the risk assessment is important for the 
institutions to consider.  
The accuracy of the RA is also a very important consideration.  Both the 
time it takes to complete the assessment and the overall accuracy are a 
trade-off according to Vorster and Labuschagne. 
Scale of criteria: 
 Scale from 1-3- Trade-off from time and accuracy 
 If time is most important-  
  1- Risk analysis is conducted after extensive preparation 
  2- Risk analysis is conducted after some preparation 
  3- Risk analysis is conducted after little preparation 
   If accuracy is most important- 
    1- Risk analysis is conducted after little preparation 
    2- Risk analysis is conducted after some preparation 
   3- Risk analysis is conducted after extensive preparation 
3. “Who will complete the risk assessment?”  The framework calls for 
differentiating methodologies by classifying who will complete the risk 
assessment.  Some risk assessments will be completed by internal 
personal while others rely extensively on experts who are external to the 
organization.   
51 
 
 
 
Depending on the risk assessment model, the assessment is either 
conducted by external experts or internal staff.   Both the cost and 
expertise is conducted in one category due to the nature of the trade-off; 
if cost is most important, the analysis is most likely conducted by internal 
staff opposed to external experts.  
Scale from 1-3- Trade-off from cost and expertise 
 If cost is most important-  
  1- Risk analysis is conducted by external experts 
  2- Risk analysis is conducted by both external and internal  
                          people 
  3- Risk analysis is conducted by internal people 
   If expertise is most important- 
    1- Risk analysis is conducted by internal people 
    2- Risk analysis is conducted by both external and internal 
        people 
    3- Risk analysis is conducted by external experts 
 
4. “What formulas will be used to calculate risk?” Once this previous 
question, question 3, has been answered an organization should compare 
the various types of risk assessment based on what specific formulas are 
used to calculate risk. This will allow the organization to determine how 
risk is calculated for their adopted RA model.   
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Organizations need to determine what type of formula is used to 
calculated risk, which indicates the complexity of the risk analysis. 
 If an organization only needs basic RA values from analysis than they 
need to adopt a model that uses an expected value matrix; an example is 
OCTAVE.  
On the other hand, if an organization needs detailed results form the RA, 
then they should implement model that uses extensive formulas.   
The organization needs to determine the trade-off of between accuracy 
and simplicity for their chosen RA.  
Scale of criteria: 
 If simplicity is most important- 
  1- Risk analysis integrates extensive mathematical  
                          calculations 
  2- Risk analysis integrates a little simple mathematical  
                          calculations 
  3- Risk analysis integrates no mathematical calculations 
If accuracy is most important- 
  1- Risk analysis integrates no mathematical calculations  
  2- Risk analysis integrates a little simple mathematical  
                          calculation 
  3- Risk analysis integrates extensive mathematical  
                          calculations 
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5. “Is the methodologies output is relative or absolute?”  As an example, 
some risk assessments may result with a value of “high” while others will 
present the organization with a specific number risk number.   
Absolute ratings can be compared, for example, if asset A has a value of 
35, and asset B has a value to 70, it is fair to say that asset B has twice 
the risk of asset A.  
Relative ratings have ratings that might indicated that asset A and asset B 
both have a rating of “high”, but that is all that can be said about the two 
assets. 
The trade off between the ranking of risk and the indication of difference 
between the risk need to be evaluated and decided on by the organization 
adopting the model. 
Scale of criteria- 
 If ranking the risks is most important- 
  1- Analysis of results are able to be compared 
  2- Analysis of results are not able to be compared  
If ranking the risks need to be comparable- 
  1- Analysis of results are not able to be compared  
  2- Analysis of results are able to be compared 
Labuschagne’s approach was used to evaluate the overall effectiveness of generic 
RA models such as ISO, NIST, COBIT, OCTAVE, and CORAS into SMFIs.  
Labuschagne’s approach is identified in Table 11, Labuschangne’s Risk below.  
  
 
 
 
Table 11 Labuschagne Risk 
Labuschagne Risk 
Assessment Evaluation 
O
C
T
A
V
E
 
C
O
R
A
S
 
IS
O
 
N
IS
T
 
C
O
B
IT
 
 
Whether risk analysis is done 
on single assets or groups of 
assets: Scale (1 or 2) 
Weight= .2 
1 1 2 1 2 
 
Where in the methodology is 
risk analysis done?   
Scale (1-3) 
Weight = .2 
 
1- Time 
3- Accuracy 
2- Time 
2- Accuracy 
1- Time 
3-Accuracy 
1- Time 
3- Accuracy 
1- Time 
3- Accuracy 
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People involved in the risk 
assessment?  Scale (1-3) 
Weight = .2 
3- Cost 
1- Expense 
 
3- Cost 
1- Expertise 
3- Cost 
1- Expertise 
2- Cost 
2- Expertise 
2- Cost 
2- Expertise 
 
 
The main formulas used  
Scale (1-3) 
Weight =.2 
3- Simplicity 
1- Accuracy 
3- Simplicity 
1- Accuracy 
1- Simplicity 
3- Accuracy 
2- Simplicity 
2- Accuracy 
2- Simplicity 
2- Accuracy 
 
 
Whether results are relative 
or absolute.   
Scale ( 1 or 2) 
Weight = .2 
 
2- Not 
Comparable 
1- Comparable 
2- Not 
Comparable 
1- Comparable 
2- Not 
Comparable 
1- Comparable 
1- Not 
Comparable 
2- Comparable 
1- Not 
Comparable 
2- Comparable 
  
 
 
3.  Research Methods 
3.1 Design Science 
This research will utilize the design science research methodology, as an IT 
artifact will be created.  Hevner, et al. present the guidelines for design science research 
in the paper “Design Science in Information Systems Research” for validation and 
evaluation (Hevner, 2004). This research will employ each of the seven guidelines to 
provide a methodical evaluation of the research IT artifact as outlined in table x  
 The artifacts shaped from this research include a RA model for SMFIs, 
SMERAM, which has been tailored towards the financial sector.  This model has been 
created and evaluated with design research, using Hevner, et al’s. design science 
approach (Hevner, 2004).  
 The seven guidelines outlined in the “Design Science in Information Systems 
Research” are listed in Table 12.  SMERAM has been developed in accordance with 
Hevner, et al’s. guidelines and the SMERAM approach overview is also listed in Table 
13. 
  
Table 12 Hevner Design Science Guidelines 
Guideline Description SMERAM 
1- Design as an 
Artifact 
Design-science research must 
produce a viable artifact in the 
form of a construct, a model, a 
The artifact, 
SMERAM,  is created 
in accordance of 
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method, or an instantiation Hevener, et al. design 
science guidelines 
 
2- Problem 
Relevance 
The objective of design-
science research is to develop 
technology-based solutions to 
important, and relevant 
business problems 
SMERAM was 
designed to address the 
staffing and financial 
limitations of SMFIs 
all while meeting and 
exceeding FDIC FIL 
regulation 
 
3- Design 
Evaluation 
The utility, quality, and 
efficacy of a design artifact 
must be rigorously 
demonstrated via well-
executed evaluation methods 
SMERAM was 
effectively tested and 
deployed in a 
community bank  
4- Research 
Contributions 
Effective design-science 
research must provide clear 
and verifiable contributions in 
the areas of the design artifact, 
design foundations, and/ 
The SMERAM RA 
model for SMFIs is the 
contribution to the 
security and SMFI 
fields 
58 
 
 
 
design methodologies 
 
5- Research 
Rigor 
Design-science research relies 
upon the application of 
rigorous methods in both the 
construction and evaluation of 
the design artifact 
SMERAM was built 
on accepted generic 
RA models such as 
ISO, NIST, COBIT, 
and CORAS while 
being honed to the 
financial industry 
 
6- Design as a 
Search Process 
The search for an effective 
artifact requires utilization 
available means to reach 
desired ends while satisfying 
laws in the problem 
environment 
SMERAM was 
developed through a 
prototype environment 
after studying various 
established generic RA 
models  
 
7- 
Communication 
of Research 
Design-science research must 
be presented effectively both 
to technology-orientated as 
SMERAM is designed 
to be used effectively 
by both technical and 
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well as management-
orientated audiences 
non-technical 
personnel;  the 
intended audience is 
bank management 
 
Design as an Artifact 
             In guideline one, Design as an Artifact, research must produce a viable artifact in 
the form of a construct, a model, a method, or an instantiation (Hevner, 2004).  This 
research will produce a RA model, SMERAM, that is tailored towards the small to 
medium sized financial industry.  SMERAM is intended for the use in small and medium 
size entities.    
SMERAM has been tested and evaluated with the management team in a SMEFI. 
The SMFI was sought out due to their size and location and they agreed to allow the 
researchers complete a no cost RA using the SMERAM model in exchange for 
publishing data.  
Problem Relevance 
 Guideline two, Problem Relevance, states that design-science research is to 
develop technology-based solutions important and relevant to business problems 
(Hevner, 2004).  SMERAM does this by creating an RA model that addresses the FDIC 
regulations and other federal mandates imposed on the financial industry.   
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There are several generic IT RA models that organizations can adapt to protect 
their information security. ISO, NIST, COBIT, CORAS and OCTAVE are included in 
this research.  However, none of these generic RA models are designed for the explicit 
use in SMFIs. In fact, all of the generic models discussed fall short when it comes to the 
unique needs of SMFIs which include financial limitations, staffing limitations, industry 
configuration, along with a RA that evaluats security in terms of assets and 
organizational security. 
Most of these models are too large for SMFIs, as a result, SMFIs do not 
adequately implement an entire generic standard, rather they employ various sections of 
their chosen model, however not the entire standard.   This makes benchmarking and 
future assessments difficult to assess the continued evaluation in the RA process.  In 
addition to the extensive nature of the models, the generic models also usually require a 
certified consultant or account to perform the RA, which is a cost SMFIs can’t afford.  If 
the generic model doesn’t require a certified consultant the IT department at the 
organization needs to have knowledgeable staff to complete the RA, which usually isn’t 
typical of a SMFI.  The overall cost of these generic RA models is typically out of reach 
of SMFIs.  
  None of the generic models are honed for the use in SMFIs.  The financial 
institution needs to be able to identify assets and threats along with identifying mitigating 
approaches for reducing risk to the financial institution.  This task, with no guidance, is 
very difficult for SMFIs management team.  
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Not all of the generic, industry accepted RA models are both asset and 
organizational based models. Including both assets and the organization itself is 
important to the overall security of an institution.  
Design Evaluation 
 Guideline three, Design Evaluation, states that the utility, quality, and efficiency 
of a design artifact must be rigorously demonstrated via well-executed evaluation 
methods (Hevner, 2004).    
SMERAM was tested via case study research with a volunteer financial institution 
that is under $500 million in assets.   A case study was conducted in Fall 2007 with the 
financial institution’s management team.   A year two follow up interview was conducted 
in Fall 2008 to determine the effectiveness of the initial RA conducted in Fall 2007.   
During the initial visit the financial institution was interviewed to determine 
current RA practices.  The financial institution stated they completed their yearly RA by 
simply passing around an excel spreadsheet that listed all the bank’s assets, and then a 
separate column stating what activities they deploy on their system to mitigate risk.   
A review of the document showed a highly inaccurate RA practice at this 
financial institution.   The institution listed the following assets in their document: 
 Person X Office Computer  (name withheld) 
 Person Y Office Computer (name withheld) 
 Person X Office Computer (name withheld) 
 Core Banking System 
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 FinCen 
 Deposit Platform 
 CU Serve Core System 
 Teller Computer 1 
 Teller Computer 2 
 Teller Computer 3 
 E mail 
 Printers 
After reviewing the list, and taking a guided tour around the bank, the researchers 
determined there were several assets that were not represented on their excel spreadsheet.  
The missing assets are the following: 
 Checking Ordering Website 
 Credit Bureau Website 
 Email system 
 Firewall 
 Fund Transfer System 
 Internet Banking System 
 Internet Website Homepage 
 Router 
 Switch 
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The assets that were overlooked by the financial institution were mostly assets 
they outsourced such as their website, internet banking, E-mail system, and check 
ordering site.  Examples of assets they overlooked because they didn’t know they had 
them were their router, firewall, and switch.  Organization can outsource an aspect of 
their business; however they cannot outsource their responsibility.  If someone had 
hacked into their internet banking site, and accessed their customers information their 
customers would be looking at the financial institution for answers, not their 3
rd
 party 
service provider.   
Overlooking these core assets is a very serious concern that SMFIs face when 
they do not follow an appropriate RA model that is specific to their industry.  RA’s need 
to be completed by the management team, and they need a RA that is honed to their 
industry, with specific assets, threats, and countermeasures.  
 
 
Research Contribution 
 Guideline four, Research Contributions, state that each artifact must provide a 
verifiable contribution to the area of the design artifact, which is in the areas of the design 
artifact, design foundations, and/ design methodologies (Hevner, 2004).   
The model proposed by the authors, SMERAM, contributes to both the 
information technology security and SMFI fields.   The information technology security 
field is benefiting from a generic RA model that can be adapted to other fields, similar to 
the fashion it was adapted to in SMFIs.   The SMFI field is benefited from an RA model 
64 
 
 
 
that is designed for their specific industry that is designed to aid in solving their unique 
information security concerns. 
 
Research Rigor 
 Guideline five, Research Rigor, stats design-science research relies upon the 
application of rigorous methods in both the construction and evaluation of the design 
artifact (Hevner, 2004).  SMERAM was built on industry accepted generic RA models 
such as ISO, NIST, COBIT, OCTAVE and CORAS while being honed to the financial 
industry, with is demonstrated in Figure 8.  
 
Figure 8 SMERAM Overview 
 
Design as a Search Process 
Industry Models
ISO
NIST
COBIT
CORAS
OCTAVE
Regulation
FDIC FIL  68-99
FDIC FIL 81-05
GLBA
Design Science
Hevner el. al's 7 steps
SMERAM
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 Guideline six, Design as a Search Process, the search for an effective artifact 
requires utilization available means to reach desired ends while satisfying laws in the 
problem environment (Hevner, 2004). SMERAM was developed through a prototype 
environment after studying various established generic RA models, such as ISO, NIST, 
COBIT, OCTAVE, and CORAS.  Many different versions of SMERAM were developed 
and analyzed prior to the final version highlighted in this research.   
 
Communication of Research 
 Guideline seven, Communication of Research, design science research must be 
presented effectively both to technology-orientated as well as management-orientated 
audiences (Hevner, 2004). SMERAM is designed to be used effectively by both technical 
and non-technical personnel. 
The intended audience of SMERAM is the bank management team.  One of the 
main concerns of SMFIs is the lack of technical personnel on staff, and SMERAM 
effectively addresses this concern as it is designed to be used by non-technical 
management staff.   This research will be allow SMFIs to conduct their annual RA as 
outlined by the FDIC, in a manner that produces a viable and value added RA.  
 
 
3.2 Aspect of Generic Models used in SMERAM 
 The generic RA models NIST, ISO, COBIT, CORAS, and OCTAVE have many 
quality attributes that make implementation into large and robust industries an 
appropriate and efficient fit.  However, these models are not an appropriate fit for smaller 
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institutions due to financial and staffing limitations.  There are steps within each model 
that has been integrated into SMERAM as introduced in Table 14.  
Table 13 Generic Models Integrated into SMERAM 
Generic RA Model Steps Integrated into SMERAM 
NIST System Characterization  
 Threat Identification 
 Control Analysis 
 Results Documentation 
ISO Organizational Security 
 Personnel Security 
CORAS Asset, Threat, Vulnerability 
COBIT Monitor and Evaluate 
OCTAVE Vulnerability Evaluation 
  
4. SMERAM 
4.1 Introducing SMERAM 
Through the use of design science and following Hevner’s guidelines, a new RA 
model has been developed specifically for the use in smaller financial institutions.   
SMERAM works to provide a risk assessment model for small to medium sized financial 
that address their unique needs in a way larger generic RA models do not.   
The first unique need is staffing limitations.  Smaller financial institutions 
typically do not have the on-site technical staff.  Larger generic RA models are not 
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designed to be completed by management, and often require several onsite technical 
employees.  
The second unique need is financial limitations.  Smaller financial institutions 
typically do not have $50,000 or more to purchase the use of a generic RA model, which 
is the cost for a medium sized organization to conduct an ISO RA model (Martin, 2002).  
It is also important to note that the purchase price is an annual expense, not a onetime 
expense.  SMERAM, a free model, is designed to be completed by bank management. 
The third unique need works with the first and second need.  Most generic RA 
models require not only a purchase price to use the model, but they also require certified 
consultants to complete the risk assessment (Podhradsky, 2009).  The certified consultant 
is an addition expense on top of the cost of using the RA model.  
The fourth unique need is addressing the information technology assets unique to 
financial institutions (Podhradsky, 2009).  SMERAM helps small and medium sized 
financial institutions to complete a valid risk assessment that is both an adaptive and 
integrated part of the entire information security program. SMERAM has predefined 
assets, threats and countermeasures built into the RA model that are specific to the 
financial industry. 
The fifth unique need that smaller financial institutions have is that they need an 
assessment that is both asset and organizational based (Streff, 2007). SMFIs need an all 
encompassing assessment that helps the organization determine the security risk with 
their IT assets along with the entire organization (Podhradsky, 2009).   
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Figure 9, SMERAM, is the model that has been developed for the use in SMFIs.  
The model addresses the six preceding unique needs of SMFIs.   
SMERAM is designed to be completed in its entirety annually, and updated 
whenever there is a major change in IT assets or networking infrastructure.  The model is 
designed to be conducted in a fashion where you progress to the next step after you 
complete the preceding step.  Meaning, if you do not successfully inventory and audit 
assets and service providers in step one, step two will be incorrect and incomplete.  The 
same concept applies to all proceeding steps.  After the organization finishes the final 
step, they have successfully completed their annual RA with SMERAM.  If there is any 
purchases, or infrastructure updates in that year, the SMFI will updated their RA starting 
with STEP one, finishing with step 7.   
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Figure 9 SMERAM Risk Assessment Model 
 
1. Inventory & 
Audit Assets
2. Identify 
Threats
3.Calculate 
Inherent Risk
4.  Apply 
System 
Controls
5.Calculate 
Residual Risk
6. 
Demonstrate 
Compliance
7. Apply 
Organizational 
Controls
SMERAM 
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4.1.1 Inventory & Audit Assets: 
 
Step One, is modeled after both NIST and CORAS. In NIST, the step is called 
System Characterization, and in CORAS is called Asset. In this step, the financial 
institution works to determine the specific assets that are owned by the organization.  
Vendors and service providers are also reviewed and listed because even though an 
organization outsources some aspect of their business does not mean they are not 
responsible for the security of the process.  
The inclusion of 3
rd
 party service providers and vendors is a new concept for RAs. 
For example, if Bank of America’s core server suffered a data breach, and customer’s 
personal information was stolen, they could not tell their shareholders, board of directors, 
or customers that it wasn’t their fault because they outsourced their information security 
with a Managed Security Service Provider (MSSP). The customer’s, shareholders, and 
board of directors will look at Bank of America, and not the MSSP. As a result of the 
data breach their credibility will be damaged.  It is extremely important to note that you 
can outsource your processes, but you cannot outsource your responsibility. Some other 
accepted models fail to include vendors and service providers, which the researchers feel 
is a serious oversight. There are certain levels of risk associated with certain service 
providers.  
The protection profile in SMERAM is similar with other notable RA models: 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability. However, SMERAM also includes volume as 
part of the overall protection profile.  Volume is not factored as high as confidentiality, 
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integrity or availability, but it is included when needed.   The weight of each area is 
calculated in terms of high, medium and low, with high being 3, medium being 2 and low 
being represented by 1.    
Confidentiality is defined as preserving authorized restrictions on information 
access and disclosure, including means for protection personal privacy and proprietary 
information  (McCumber, 2005).  Financial institutions have a responsibility to protect 
their customer’s data from unauthorized access, they must make sure their information 
systems are protected and secure.  
Integrity is defined as guarding against improper information modification or 
destruction and includes ensuing information non-repudiation and authenticity  
(McCumber, 2005). The data that is inherent to a financial institution involves personal 
identifying information that can be used to steal someone identity.  This data needs to be 
secure and accurate. Inaccurate financial data can lead have serious consequences on 
someone’s financial history.  In SMERAM, the weight for data integrity is rated in terms 
of high, medium and low.   
Availability is defined as ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of 
information  (McCumber, 2005).  The financial institution and the customers need to 
have near 24-7 access to the financial information.  Customers need to know their 
balances and account data, and financial institutions need to be able to access all records 
to conduct their routine business.  
Availability goes well beyond the scope of data into services and information 
technology systems. A bank must have access to their core banking platform in order to 
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conduct their business. Also, the connection to the FDIC must be secure and available 
when it is needed.  If a bank cannot transfer deposits to the FDIC, they will lose money 
on their interest payments.  
There is a predefined amount of acceptable downtime for all services and 
information technology assets.  Financial institutions need to be able to rate which assets 
have to have the highest amount of uptime.  In SMERAM, the weight for availability is 
rated in terms of high, medium and low.   
Volume is defined in relative terms. Volume is a new consideration in the 
information technology security area, and it is integrated into SMERAM. Confidentiality, 
integrity and availability have been constant and including volume is something the 
researchers believe valid and necessary inclusion. For example, if a financial institution 
has a two servers holding customer data, each that require high confidentiality, high 
integrity, and need high availability, but one server has 1 file, and the other has over 
1,000,000 files, volume will tell the financial institution more weight should be placed on 
the server with more records.  A data breach is serious regardless of where it occurs, 
however, the researchers believe a data breach that effects millions of people versus one 
that affects a few hundred has different considerations. In SMERAM, the weight for 
volume is rated in terms of high, medium and low.   
Appendix C lists all of the assets that are typical to financial institution. This 
guideline helps to ensure that the financial institution doesn’t overlook any of their IT 
assets or service providers, which will result in a more accurate RA.  
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 Figure 10 outlines the interface where the customers select the assets and service 
providers that are typical to SMFIs.  After this they progress to step 2, Identify Threats, 
which is threats per each asset they outlined.  
 
Figure 10 SMERAM Interface 
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The financial institution ranks each of the assets and service providers in terms of 
high, medium and low.  After each asset is ranked, volume is included in the evaluation 
in a means that is relative to the financial institution.  The screen the SMFI sees on each 
of the assets they outlined they have in their organization.  
This step demonstrates how SMERAM is honed towards SMFIs.  Some of the 
assets are typical to any institution, but SMERAM also lays out all FDIC assets.  
 
Figure 11 SMERAM: CIA-V 
 
 
 
 
4.1.2 Identify Threats: 
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The second step is modeled after NIST and CORAS.  In NIST the step is Threat 
Identification, and in CORAS the step is Threat. In this step of SMERAM, the financial 
institution is assessing the threats inherent to each asset.  Identifying threats is something 
that most organizations tend to confuse with vulnerabilities; a definition of a threat is 
“any circumstance with the potential to intentionally or unintentionally exploit a specific 
vulnerability in an information system resulting in a loss of confidentiality, integrity or 
availability (McCumber, 2005).” 
A threat library is a valuable piece of literature for any organization, and that 
holds true for financial information. Threat libraries determine what threats are specific to 
specific assets. Financial institutions traditionally obtain a threat library in one of two 
ways, they could spend the time to research threats and build out their own library, or 
they could purchase a readymade library and apply the threats to their specific asses. In 
the case of SMERAM, the threat library that is specific to banking assets is already 
included with the RA model.  
The financial institution determined the assets, service providers and venders in 
step one, and in step two, SMERAM assigns the threats that are unique to the assets, 
according to ISO (ISO 27002 Standard , 2005).    All assets that are predefined for the 
financial industry are located in Appendix C.   Tables 15, 16, 17 & 18 are examples of 
banking assets and threats associated with those assets. The full threat library that is 
associated with typical financial institution assets and 3
rd
 party service providers is also 
located in the appendix in Appendix F (ISO 27002 Standard , 2005).   
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Table 14 Internet Banking System Threats 
Internet Banking System 
Data Leakage 
 
Pharming   
 
Phishing Defacement  
 
Intentional 
Misuse    
 Unauthorized 
Remote Access     
 
Degraded / 
Unavailable    
 
Malicious 
Software   
Outsourced    Unauthorized 
Physical Access    
 Unauthorized 
Viewing   
User Error    
 
Environmental 
Incident    
 
Man-made / 
Natural 
Disaster    
 
 
Table 15 Core Banking System Threats 
Core Banking System 
Data Loss    
 
Unauthorized 
System Access    
 
Intentional 
Misuse    
 
Outsourced    
 
Unauthorized 
Remote Access    
 Degraded / 
Unavailable    
 
Hardware 
Failure    
 
Unauthorized 
Physical Access    
 
Eavesdropping 
/ Sniffing         
 
Malicious 
Software    
 Unauthorized 
Viewing    
 
Social 
Engineering    
 
Software 
Acquisition    
 
Man-made / 
Natural 
Disaster    
 
Environmental 
Incident    
 User Error    
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Table 16 Funds Transfer System Threats 
Funds Transfer System 
Unauthorized 
System Access    
 
Eavesdropping 
/ Sniffing    
 
Degraded / 
Unavailable    
 
Malicious 
Software    
 
Unauthorized 
Viewing    
 Intentional 
Misuse    
 
Unauthorized 
Remote Access    
 
User Error       
 
Outsourced    
 
Social 
Engineering    
 Man-made / 
Natural 
Disaster    
 
Unauthorized 
Physical Access   
   
 
 
Table 17 Credit Bureau Website 
Credit Bureau Website 
User Error    
 
Data Loss    
 
Social 
Engineering    
 
Defacement   
 
Intentional 
Misuse         
 Unauthorized 
Viewing         
 
Eavesdropping 
/ Sniffing         
 
Unauthorized 
System Access         
 
Outsourced   
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Table 18 Deposit Platform Threats 
Deposit Platform 
User Error    
 
Data Loss    
 
Social 
Engineering    
 
Defacement   
 
Intentional 
Misuse         
 Unauthorized 
Viewing         
 
Eavesdropping 
/ Sniffing         
 
Unauthorized 
System Access         
 
Outsourced  Software 
Acquisition         
 
Man-made / 
Natural 
Disaster 
    
 
 
Figure 12 depicts a screen shot form SMERAM showing the threats associated 
with a Core Banking System.  In the next step, SMERAM shows the inherent level of 
risk associated with each asset.  
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4.1.3 Calculate Inherent Risk: 
 
Step three is modeled after the CORAS step Vulnerability. In this step, 
Determining the Inherent Risk, the financial institution will be able to see which assets 
represent the greatest risk to the bank. The inherent risk of each asset is the asset with no 
security controls applied to mitigate risk  (McCumber, 2005). For example, what would 
be the risk of having a domain controller with absolutely no controls for security 
enabled?   
The current accepted industry standard uses the equation risk =asset*value*threat. 
The researchers believe this formula is inherently flawed due to the consideration of the 
monetary value. If you ask 10 different people to place a value on an asset, you will more 
than likely get 10 different answers.  Is it the purchase cost, the replacement cost, or the 
depreciated cost?  There is no standard for this issue.   
Figure 12  SMERAM: Threats to Core Banking System 
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The formula the researchers would like the audience to consider is risk = 
confidentiality *integrity*availability, with the consideration of volume when CIA is 
equal.  
With the introduced scale of 1-3 for high, medium, and low; a high 
confidentiality, high integrity, and high availability would equate to 3*3*3 times by a 
volume decimal multiplier if confidentiality, integrity, and availability are equal.  
If there are two servers equal in CIA, and Server A has 1,000 records, and Server 
B has 1,000,000 records, and if both servers were compromised, Server B would result in 
a higher loss for the institution.  In this new approach of including volume, the servers 
with higher volume should be protected more, as a breach could result in more harm, 
when CIA is equal. Figure 12 shows the inherent risk level for a Core Banking System, 
while Figure 13 shows the inherent risk a printer introduces to the organization.  This 
comparison allows the SMFI to have a visual depiction of the different inherent risk 
levels of their assets and service providers.  
The calculation that SMERAM employs to determine the inherent risk involves 
analyzing the threats associated with the asset.  Each threat is given a weight of high, 
medium or low; whereas high equals 3, medium is 2, and low is 1.  The assets are then 
compared against each other, and ranked in sequential order. Figures 13 and 14 depict the 
asset with the highest risk and the asset with the lowest inherent risk to the financial 
institution.  
This step is a demonstration of how SMERAM helps in the decision making 
process at SMFIs, and is honed towards the financial sector.  
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Figure 13 SMERAM: Inherent risks for Core Banking System 
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Figure 14 SMERAM: Inherent risks for a Printer 
 
4.1.4 Apply System Controls: 
The next step is modeled after the NIST Controls phase.  System controls are the 
system safeguards the bank wants to implement to protect their information technology 
assets. The system controls that are available for implementation are included with the 
treat library, and are listed in Appendix F. The organization needs to determine what 
controls they apply to their information systems to mitigate risk.   
In this step, the financial institution keeps building on the previous steps of 
inventory their assets and 3
rd
 party service providers, indentifying steps, and determining 
the inherent risk to the IT assets.  During step 4, Apply System Controls, the SMFI 
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reviews the predefined list of system safeguards that they currently deploy on their IT 
assets. 
This step allows the financial institution to determine what type of controls they 
are currently applying and what type of controls are available to apply towards their IT 
assets.  This step is also crucial for developing a baseline in which all other RA’s can be 
evaluated against. 
Table 19 outlines the typical controls that are implemented in SMFIs, which is 
also outlined in Appendix D (ISO 27002 Standard , 2005).  Appendix E lists controls 
mapped to assets (ISO 27002 Standard , 2005).  
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Table 19 Controls Typical to Small and Medium Sized Financial Institutions 
Controls Typical to SMFIs 
Authorized 
User 
Restrictions 
Access Logs Formal TSP 
Review 
Formal TSP 
Selection 
Access Log 
Monitoring 
Invalid 
Attempt 
Lockout 
Strong 
Passwords 
Unique User 
Accounts 
Encrypt Stored 
Data 
Formal 
Patching 
Process 
Intrusion 
Detection/ 
Prevention 
Back-up 
Critical Data 
Change 
Default 
Security 
Settings 
Incident 
Response 
Program 
Incident 
Response 
Program Test 
Clear Screen 
Awareness 
Forced Session 
Expiration 
Maintenance 
Logs 
Multi-Factor 
Authentication 
System Access 
Warning 
Activity Logs Change 
Default 
Account 
Settings 
Maintenance 
Log Review 
Temporarily 
Disable Absent 
Employee 
Accounts 
Vulnerability 
Assessment: 
Administrative 
Privileges 
Activity Log 
Monitoring 
Last 
Successful 
Logon 
Business 
Continuity 
Plan Test 
Network 
Diagram 
Test Back-up 
Recovery 
Formal TSP 
Selection 
Penetration 
Testing 
Social 
Engineering 
Security 
Awareness 
Spyware 
Protection 
Virus 
Protection 
Security 
Cameras 
Physical 
Security 
Awareness 
Motion 
Sensors 
Restricted 
Access Area 
Formal 
Patching 
Process 
Monitor 
Placements 
Dual Power 
Supply 
Firewall Alert Reporting Back-up 
Critical Data 
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Activity Log 
Monitoring 
Remove 
Unnecessary 
Software 
Maintenance 
Logs 
Uninterruptible 
Power Supply 
Off-Site 
Backup 
Power 
Conditioning 
Disable / 
Remove 
Hardware 
Dust Filtering Humidity 
Control 
Temperature 
Control 
Locked Door Biometrics Content 
Filtering 
Disable 
Terminated 
Employee 
Accounts 
Inactive 
Lockout 
Business 
Continuity 
Plan 
Vulnerability 
Assessment 
Off-Site 
Backup 
Formal TSP 
Review 
Monitored 
Location 
Network 
Diagram 
Line 
Disconnect 
Backup 
Generator 
Redundant 
Systems 
 
 
 Figure 15 shows the screen the bank management uses to select the controls for 
each of the assets they outlined in step 1.  This screen is displayed for each asset they 
own.  
 SMERAM assigns a ranking of high, medium, or low to each of the controls to 
determine the impact they have on mitigating risk to the assets.  Appendix D shows the 
rating that has been applied to each control. 
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Figure 15 SMERAM: System Controls for Core Banking System 
 
 
4.1.5 Calculate Residual Risk: 
 
The fifth step is modeled after OCTAVE’s Vulnerability step. In this step the 
financial institution determines the residual risk that is associated with IT assets after the 
controls are applied. The residual risk is the risk the asset imposes after having controls 
applied to it. Ideally, the controls will reduce your assets risk.  It is extremely important 
to note that applying controls to IT assets does not completely eliminate the risk the asset 
imposes to the institution.  Risk can only be at an acceptable level, not a “zero” level. 
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The financial institution has already inputted their assets and service providers, as 
outlined in step 1.  In step 2, they were given the threats that are associated with their 
assets.  Next, the financial institution outlined the controls they apply from the given 
control list. Next, the system displays the residual risk associated with their information 
technology assets. SMERAM calculates residual risk by determining the available 
controls, and dividing the applied controls, by remaining, unapplied controls.  Figure 16 
depicts the residual risk calculation of a core banking system.  
To calculate the residual risk SMERAM references the inherent risk value, which 
is the initial value placed on the asset. The inherent risk, which is the treats associated 
with the asset, has an equal amount of controls.  Meaning, if there is 100 points of threats, 
there is 100 points of available controls.  SMERAM then analyzes the controls that are 
actually implemented to mitigate risk.  SMERAM then compares the initial value with no 
controls implemented, and the value with controls implemented.  The initial value, is then 
compared to the implement controls value, to see what percentage of controls available 
are being implements.  For example, if the available controls have a total sum of 100 
(high is 3, medium is 2, low is 1), and they are implementing a host of controls that total 
80, the SMFI is implementing 80% of what is available. The final value on the High (3), 
Medium (2), and Low (1) scale would be 2.42, which was calculated by taking .8 divided 
by .33; .8 is the percentage of controls implemented, and .33 is used because of the scales 
ratio. 
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Figure 16 SMERAM: Residual Risk for Core Banking System 
 
4.1.6 Preliminary Results and Reporting 
The sixth step is modeled after both NIST and COBIT.  The NIST step Results, 
and the COBIT step Monitor and Evaluate are combined for this step. This step revolves 
around reporting preliminary results of the RA and improving the process.  In this step, 
the organization learns if they are incompliance with the laws that govern the industry. 
They also get a firsthand look at what they are currently doing and what they can do to 
improve their security.     
In terms of regulatory compliance, conducting an annual RA by the management 
team earns the compliance approval.  
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In this step the financial institution has a screen that is a combination to the screen 
in the previous step.  On the screen the institution views a particular asset, the current 
controls implemented, and the progress bar which indicates their residual risk.  The 
financial institution can then select future controls they would like to implement to see 
how their risk level for their asset will be reduced; this is demonstrated in Figure 15.   
This is a demonstration of how SMERAM is helps in the decision making process.  The 
SMFI can use the results of their RA to determine how to spend their limited information 
security budget.  
 
 
Figure 17 SMERAM: Determine Compliance, Improve Security 
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4.1.7 Apply Organizational Controls: 
The final step, which is designed after ISOs Organizational Security step, allows 
the financial organization determines safeguards the bank want to implement on an 
organizational level, not system level as outlined in the previous steps above.  
Organizational security allows the SMFI to determine what security practices should be 
implemented to establish sound information security practices to support the entire 
organization, opposed to just a single asset.  
   In the previous steps, the SMFI determined their asset based RA, in this step the 
SMFI works to address the security for the entire organization. 
A security awareness program would be an excellent example. Getting all 
employees’ familiar with information security is a great way to make people feel 
involved. There are different things you can do, such as posters, fliers, email reminders, 
among other activities.   As indicated in Figure 16, the SMFI can select an organizational 
control, learn about what it is, and then determine if they currently or plan to employ the 
control.  
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Figure 18 SMERAM: Organizational Security & Controls 
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5.0 Single Case Study, Anonymous SMFI 
5.1 Case Study Research 
For validation and evaluation of SMERAM a single case study was completed.  
There are five rationales for selecting a single case study opposed to a multiple case study 
(Yin, 2003):   
1. The first rationale for adopting a single case study is when the case 
represents the critical case in evaluating and testing a well-formed theory.  
The theory that is being evaluated needs to be clean with the propositions 
and the circumstances within the propositions that are being perceived as 
true.   A single case study is used to confirm, challenge, or extend the 
given theory.  A single case study can be adopted to determine whether a 
theory’s propositions are accurate or whether some alternative set of 
explanations could prove to be more relevant. 
2. The second rationale for a single case study is when the study represents a 
unique or extreme case.   These two situations commonly occur in clinical 
psychology, when a diagnosis is so rate, it would be important to 
document all findings when analyzing the data.  
3. The third rationale for a single case study is when the single case is the 
representative or typical case for the environment.  The lessons learned 
from this type of study have proved to be indicative of the lesions learned 
had the case study been a multiple case study. 
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4. The fourth rationale for a single case study is when the study is considered 
a revelatory case.  This situation is used when a research has an 
opportunity to observe a phenomenon that was previously inaccessible to 
scientific investigations. 
5. The fifth rationale for implementing a single case study is longitudinal 
studies.  This situation is used when a study is compromised of two or 
more points of time.   For example you conduct your experiment one year, 
and do a follow-up the next year. 
 
A single case study was selected for testing SMERAM due to the third and fifth 
rationales.  First, the third rationale, because it indicates if a single case is the 
representative or typical case for the environment then one single case study is sufficient. 
The SMFI that was selected for deployment doesn’t have any impact of the outcome of 
the research.  Regardless of what SMFI was used, the results from deployment would 
have been the same.  Second, the firth rational is used because the study will be 
conducted over two years.  The first year will be the initial interview and risk assessment.  
The second year will be compromised of a follow-up and interview. 
One downfall of single case studies is that they might prove to be different from 
the initial case design.  As a result, single-case design requires very careful thought and 
investigation of the potential case to minimize the occurrence of misrepresentation (Yin, 
2003).  
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 The case study allowed the researchers to work close with the financial institution 
to get a firsthand look at the strengths and weaknesses of SMERAM implemented in the 
SMFI.  
 
5.2 Single Case Study 
The researchers piloted the generic SMERAM model to understand its strengths 
and limitations in SMFIs. Specifically, the SMERAM risk assessment model was tested 
through a case study in a SMFI in South Dakota. The SMFI was sought out by the 
researchers to perform a voluntary RA in return for publishing data and testing purposes. 
The SMFI met with the researchers on five separate occasions, four times in the fall of 
2007 to complete the SMERAM RA process, and once again during the fall of 2008 to 
hold a follow-up meeting.  Table 20 introduces a step by step account for the four week 
process during fall of 2007. 
 
Table 20 SMERAM integration into Financial Institution- Overview 
Week What was done  
 
Week 1 
 
The first week involved determining all of the assets that 
the credit union had. The SMFI had two of their 
management employees working with the authors to 
complete the RA. The two management employees were 
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not technologically advanced employees. The SMFI 
employees were given a list of the traditional assets that 
banks have and had to determine which of the assets that 
they had.  
 
 
Week 2 
 
The second week the researchers came bank onsite to 
review the list of assets, vendors and services providers. 
After the asset, vendor and service providers were 
complete, the SMFI needed to determine, what controls 
they currently apply to mitigate risk. The authors then 
outlined the threats that applied to each asset which is 
available from a predefined list. As demonstrated in 
Figure 11.  
 
Week 3 The third week involved reviewing the controls the SMFI 
determined were in place, and determining residual risk.  
Residual risk, as demonstrated in Figure 14 is the risk 
associated with the asset after controls have been applied.  
Next the SMFI can review how implementing further 
controls can further reduce their security risk, as 
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demonstrated in Figure 15.  
 
Week 4 
 
The fourth week, the SMFI reviewed the available 
organizational controls that were available, and selected 
whether they currently implement, or plan to implement 
the control. If they do not implement a control, they 
simply leave it blank; this is indicated in Figure 16.   If the 
SMFI is not certain what the specific control is, they click 
on the controls button, and there is a description of what 
the control is, and what it is useful.  
 
 
5.1.1 Case Study Questionnaire 
 The case study questions were developed to determine current RA practices and 
concerns, while also addressing the 5 research problems indicated in section 1.2.  The 
answers to these questions were used to help determine the effectiveness of implementing 
SMERAM into a SMFI.  
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1. What are your current risk assessment practices? 
2. Are you following a defined model? 
3. Who conducts the risk assessment? 
4. How often do you complete your assessment? 
5. Do you upgrade your assessment throughout the year? 
6. What security concerns do you have with your organization? 
7. What are you assets? 
8. What threats are associated with your assets? 
9. What controls do you apply to mitigate risk? 
10. Do you feel you have a good handle on your information security? 
11. What areas would you like to improve? 
12. What type of annual budget do you have for information security? 
13. How do you decide to spend your funds? 
14. Do you outsource any of your information technology? 
15. Are you concerned about your 3rd party service providers security? 
 
 
Year One Answers: The answers were gathered through an interview during the fall of 
2007, answers are paraphrased. 
1. What are your current risk assessment practices? 
We have an Excel spreadsheet that the management staff passes around and lists 
our assets and the acts taken to secure them 
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2. Are you following a defined model? 
No 
3. Who conducts the risk assessment? 
Employee listed 2 personnel in the management team 
4. How often do you complete your assessment? 
Whenever we are about to be audited 
5. Do you upgrade your assessment throughout the year? 
No 
6. What security concerns do you have with your organization? 
None 
7. What are you assets? 
The SMFI listed person x computer, person y computer, teller computers, core 
banking sever, check ordering computer, printer, payroll software, funds transfer 
system, proof system and lending program 
8. What threats are associated with your assets? 
I’m not sure 
9. What controls do you apply to mitigate risk? 
Anti-Virus, user accounts and passwords 
10. Do you feel you have a good handle on your information security? 
Not really, I’m a loan specialists 
11. What areas would you like to improve? 
Not sure what needs to be improved 
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12. What type of annual budget do you have for information security? 
Very limited 
13. How do you decide to spend your funds? 
Whatever the board of directors says to improve, we improve 
14. Do you outsource any of your information technology? 
Website, online banking, ATM, credit card processing, and email 
15. Are you concerned about your 3rd party service providers security? 
No 
 
Year Two Answers: The answers were gathered through an interview during the fall of 
2008, answers are paraphrased. 
1. What are your current risk assessment practices? 
We follow the RA process that you introduced last year [SMERAM] 
2. Are you following a defined model? 
Yes [SMERAM] 
3. Who conducts the risk assessment? 
The bank employee listed 2 of the managers 
4. How often do you complete your assessment? 
Annually 
5. Do you upgrade your assessment throughout the year? 
Yes, we just had a new Proof System installed, and we updated our assets, and 
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knew what controls were on the previous system, and what to implement on this 
system 
6. What security concerns do you have with your organization? 
Increased security concerns with 3
rd
 party service providers.  
7. What are you assets? 
The organization showed the researcher a list of assets from their RA- Researcher 
reviewed and determined their work was highly accurate 
8. What threats are associated with your assets? 
The organization showed the researcher a list of threats associated with their 
assets- Researcher reviewed and determined their work was highly accurate 
9. What controls do you apply to mitigate risk? 
The organization showed the researcher a list of controls associated with their 
assets- Researcher reviewed and determined their work was highly accurate 
10. Do you feel you have a good handle on your information security? 
Yes, we feel that know we have a model to follow, and even though we don’t fully 
understand the details of all the technology, we feel we can adequately protect 
our assets 
11. What areas would you like to improve? 
More automation of the process 
12. What type of annual budget do you have for information security? 
Very minimal 
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13. How do you decide to spend your funds? 
The assets with the highest inherent and residual risk 
14. Do you outsource any of your information technology? 
Yes, quite a bit; website, online banking, card processing and ATM 
15. Are you concerned about your 3rd party service providers security? 
Yes, we have heard there have been a few breaches at different, service providers, 
however, none of ours have been hit 
 
 
To further evaluate the effectiveness of SMERAM, an evaluation matrix was 
created to triangulate the model with the objectives of the research along with the case 
study.  Table 21 outlines the matrix and the research objectives. Each area of the matrix 
was aided by the interview questions, which are listed after the matrix.  
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Table 21 Evaluation Matrix 
Evaluation Matrix 
Resource 
Effectiveness  
Financial 
Limitations  
Staffing Limitations  Time Limitations 
Interview  Interview  Interview  
Value added / 
Decision Making  
Measure 
current 
knowledge  
Identify Areas of 
Risk  
Decision Making  
Interview / 
Observation  
Assessment Results  Assessment Results  
Organizational 
Acceptance  
Appropriate of 
Model Size  
Organization 
Awareness Lacking  
Not part of 
scoping  
Interview/RA 
Report  
Interview  Interview  
 
 
1. Resource Effectiveness: Financial Limitations 
 
Questions Asked 
 What type of annual budget do you have for information security? 
 How do you decide to spend your funds? 
 Do you outsource any of your information technology?  
 Year One Answers 
 Very limited 
 Whatever the BOD says to improve, we improve 
 Website, online banking, ATM, credit card processing, and email 
 Year Two Answers 
 Very minimal 
 The assets with the highest inherent and residual risk 
 Quite a bit; website, online banking, card processing, and email 
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The second question asked, “How do you decided to spend your funds,” proved to 
be very informative on how SMERAM helps SMFIs make decisions.  In year one, the 
SMFI relied on the board of directors to initiate the spending of IT dollars.  In year two, 
the SMFI used SMERAM to determine which assets impose the greatest amount of risk 
to the institution, which is where they spent their IT dollars.  This is one of the objectives 
of this research.    
2. Resource Effectiveness: Staffing Limitations 
 
Questions Asked 
 Who conducts the risk assessment? 
 How often do you complete your assessment? 
 Do you upgrade your assessment throughout the year? 
  Do you outsource any of your information technology? 
 Year One Answers 
 Two Personnel 
 Whenever we are about to be audited 
 No 
 Website, online banking, ATM, credit card processing, and 
email 
 Year Two Answers 
 Two members of the management team 
 Annually 
 Yes, whenever there is a major change to the organization 
 Quite a bit; website, online banking, card processing, and 
email 
The second question, “How often do you complete your assessment,” 
demonstrated that SMERAM is effective in bringing the institution into compliance with 
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the regulation that governs their industry.  In year one, the SMFI only complete the RA 
when they were about to be audited; which is every 18 months.  With SMERAM the 
SMFI conducted the RA annually, which bring the institution from out of compliance to 
in compliance. This is one of the objectives of this research. 
3. Resource Effectiveness: Time Limitations 
 
Questions Asked 
   What are your current risk assessment practices? 
   Are you following a defined model? 
   How often do you complete your assessment? 
   Do you upgrade your assessment throughout the year? 
 Year One Answers 
 Excel Spreadsheet 
 No 
 Whenever we are about to get audited 
 No 
 Website, online banking, ATM, credit card processing, and 
email 
 Year Two Answers 
 Model introduced last year; SMEREAM 
 Yes, SMERAM 
 Annually 
 Yes, whenever there is a change: New proof system 
 Quite a bit; website, online banking, card processing, and email  
The first question asks the SMFI, “What are your current risk assessment 
practices,” this question showed the researchers that the SMFI went from not gaining any 
value from their RA to a RA that is value added to the SMFI.  
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4. Value Added/ Decision Making: Measure Current Knowledge 
 
Questions Asked 
   What security concerns do you have with your organization? 
   What are you assets? 
   What threats are associated with your assets? 
 
 Year One Answers 
 None 
 SMFI listed Person Xs computer, Person Ys computer, teller 
computers, core banking server, check ordering computer, 
printer, payroll software, funds transfer system, proof system 
and lending program 
 I’m not sure  
 Year Two Answers 
 Increased security concerns with TSP 
 The organization showed the researcher a list of assets that 
were found with their use of SMERAM, this was checked by 
the researchers and proved to be correct 
 The organization showed the researchers a list of threats 
associated with their assets form SMERAM 
 
The three questions demonstrate that the SMFI went from merely appeasing 
regulators to conducting a RA that adds values to the institution.  This is one of the 
objectives of the research.  
 
5. Value Added/ Decision Making: Identify Areas of Risk 
 
Questions Asked 
   What controls do you apply to mitigate risk? 
   Do you feel you have a good handle on your information security? 
   What areas would you like to improve? 
   Are you concerned about your 3rd party service providers security? 
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 Year One Answers 
 Anti-Virus, ser accounts and passwords 
 Not really, I’m a loan specialists 
 Not sure what needs to be improved 
 No 
 Year Two Answers 
 The organization showed the researchers a list of controls 
associated with their assets.  The researchers reviewed the list, 
and it proved to be accurate 
 Yes, we feel we know we have a model to follow, and even 
though we don’t fully understand the details, we feel we can 
adequately protect our assets 
 More automation of the process 
 Yes, we have heard there have been a few breaches at different 
service providers, however none of ours have been 
compromised. 
 
The second question asks the SMFI, “Do you feel you have a good handle on 
your information security ,” this question showed the researchers that the SMFI went 
from not feeling they couldn’t conduct a value added RA to feeling they could conduct a 
reliable RA for the institution.   
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7. Value Added/ Decision Making: Decision Making 
 
Questions Asked 
  Do you upgrade your assessment throughout the year? 
  What security concerns do you have with your organization? 
  What areas would you like to improve? 
 Year One Answers 
 No 
 None 
 Note sure what needs to be improved  
 Year Two Answers 
 Yes, whenever there is a major change 
 Increase security concerns with TSP 
 More automation  
 
The second question asked the institution, “What security concerns do you have 
with your organization.”  In year one, the SMFI did have any concerns, in year two the 
SMFI was aware of security concerns with TSP, and that was their focus.  
   
8.  Organizational Acceptance: Appropriateness of Model Size 
 
Questions Asked 
  What are your current risk assessment practices? 
   Are you following a defined model? 
   Do you feel you have a good handle on your information security? 
   What areas would you like to improve?  
 
 Year One Answers 
 Excel spreadsheet passed around 
 No  
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 Not really, I’m a loan specialist 
 Not sure what needs to be improved 
 Year Two Answers 
 We follow the RA process introduced last year 
 Yes, SMERAM 
 Yes, we feel that know we have a model to follow, and 
even though we don’t fully understand the details of all the 
technology, we feel we can adequately protect our assets 
 More automation  
   
 
 
 
 
 8.   Organizational Acceptance: Organization Awareness Lacking 
 
Questions Asked 
 What security concerns do you have with your organization? 
   Do you feel you have a good handle on your information   security? 
   What areas would you like to improve? 
 Are you concerned about your 3rd party service providers security? 
 Year One Answers 
 None 
 Not really, I’m a loan specialist 
 Not sure what needs to be improved 
 No  
 Year Two Answers 
 Increased concerns with TSP 
 Yes, we feel that know we have a model to follow, and 
even though we don’t fully understand the details of all the 
technology, we feel we can adequately protect our assets 
 More Automation 
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 Yes, we have heard there have been a few breaches at 
different service providers, however non of ours have been 
hit 
     
   
9.  Organizational Acceptance: Not part of scoping 
 
Questions Asked 
 What are your current risk assessment practices? 
  Are you following a defined model? 
  Who conducts the risk assessment? 
 
 Year One Answers 
 Excel Spreadsheet passed around management 
 No 
 2 personnel  
 Year Two Answers 
 RA model introduced last year, SMERAM 
 Yes 
 2 members of the management team 
   
 
 
The overall message the researchers received from the two interviewers is that the 
information security posture at the SMFI increased from year one to year two.  The SMFI 
stated that while they are still unsure of their abilities to handle information technology 
on the technical side, they believe they can manage the security of the systems.   
The SMFIs managers stated that they feel they have a better grasp on their assets 
and countermeasures needed to protect the organization and their customer’s personal 
110 
 
 
 
data. The SMFI also was using the data provided by SMERAM to decide how to spend 
their information security budget.  
The interview process helped the researches identify whether or not SMERAM 
helped the SMFI handle the core objectives of this research, which was financial 
limitations, staffing limitations, aid in the decision making process, all while being honed 
to the financial sector.  
The overall message the researchers received from the anonymous SMFI is that 
they were surprised how easy the RA process could be, along with the added value it 
gave to their institution. The two management employees indicated were impressed with 
their ability to conduct a viable RA involving their information technology, given their 
nontechnical background.  
The SMFI found that determining their assets and service providers was easier 
than expected, and when compared to previous RA’s they found they had more assets 
than they were reporting before.  This means, they were not only under reporting their 
assets, they were giving zero consideration to their unreported assets security.   This 
incident is a serious concern. 
 
5.2.1 Step One: Inventory and Audit Assets 
In this step, the financial institution outlined having the following assets. The 
assets with an “*” indicate the asset management has been outsourced.  
1- Deposit Platform* 
2- FinCen 
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3- Advantage ATM* 
4- Anti-Virus Software 
5- Check Ordering Website* 
6- Credit Bureau Website* 
7- CU Serve Core System* 
8- Desktop Computers 
9- E-Mail* 
10- Firewall* 
11- Funds Transfer System* 
12- Internet Banking System* 
13- Printers 
14- Router 
15- Switch 
Table 22, outlines typical assets that are located in SMFIs, the SMFI had some of 
the assets as indicated in the list above, but not all of the assets.  
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Table 22- Common SMFI Assets & Service Providers 
Common SMFI Assets and Service Providers 
Internet Banking 
System 
 
Core Banking 
system 
 
Fund Transfer 
System 
Credit Bureau 
Website 
Deposit 
Platform 
Printers Notebook 
Computers 
Desktop 
Computers 
Firewall Lending 
Program 
Marketing 
Software 
Payday Lending Payroll 
Software 
PDA’s Router 
Switch  Firewall Smart Phones Terminal 
Services 
Web Server 
Email Server Accounting 
Software 
Background 
Checking 
Website 
Anti-Virus 
Software 
ATM 
Call Reporting 
Software 
HMDA Operating 
Systems 
Merchant 
Card 
Processing 
System 
Intrusion 
Detection 
System 
File Server Item Imaging Local Area 
Network 
Check 
Ordering 
Website 
Check 
Reader / 
Sorter 
VoIP Deb/Credit 
Cards 
Bank Website Application 
Server 
Remote 
Capture 
Systems 
Storage Area 
Network 
Wide Area 
Network 
 
Proof System   
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5.2.2 Step Two: Identify Threats 
 In this step, the financial institution has already selected their assets and 
SMERAM determines their corresponding threats.  Considering that SMERAM is honed 
to the SMFI industry, the financial institution did not have to research the threats 
associated with the asset as it is already pre-defined. The threats associated with typical 
SMFI assets include environment threats, natural threats, and human threats. 
 Environment threats include long-term power failure, liquid damage, chemical 
damage, among others.  Natural threats include floods, tornadoes, earthquakes, electrical 
storms, among others. Human threats include intentional and unintentional acts such as 
viruses, Trojans and data deletion, and unauthorized access among others.  
 
5.2.3 Step Three: Determine Inherent Risk 
 
 The inherent risk is viewed by the financial institution after the assets and threats 
that are associated with their assets are determined, as indicated in Figure 12 in section 
4.1.3.   The SMFI views the risk associated with each of their assets with no controls 
applied.  This helps visually demonstrate the importance of controls and mitigating 
activities.  The SMFI can visually determine which assets introduce more risk to the 
organization. This also gives the SMFI the opportunity to determine which assets needed 
the greatest protection.  In the anonymous SMFI, they found that the assets they outlined 
introduced risk into the organization in the following order.  
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1- Core Banking System  
2- Deposit Platform* 
3- Funds Transfer System* 
4- Internet Banking System* 
5- FinCen 
6- Advantage ATM* 
7- Check Ordering Website* 
8- Credit Bureau Website* 
9- Anti-Virus Software 
10- Desktop Computers 
11- Firewall* 
12- E-Mail* 
13- Router 
14- Switch 
15- Printers 
 
5.2.4 Step Four: Identify Controls 
 
 In this step, the SMFI reviewed the controls that are specific to their assets they 
outlined in step one.  Figure 13 outlines a single asset, the Core Banking System, and the 
controls available to implement on that system. The SMFI see’s a screen similar to Figure 
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13 for each of the assets they outlined in Figure 11 in section 4.1.3.   The SMFI has to go 
through this process for each of the assets they own.  
Common controls found in SMFIs are listed in Table 22, Common Controls; this 
list is not asset specific rather in general terms.  A list of assets associated with controls 
can be found in Appendix D.  
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Table 23 Common Controls 
Common Controls Applied to Assets 
Authorized 
User 
Restrictions 
Access Logs Formal TSP 
Review 
Formal TSP 
Selection 
Access Log 
Monitoring 
Invalid 
Attempt 
Lockout 
Strong 
Passwords 
Unique User 
Accounts 
Encrypt Stored 
Data 
Formal 
Patching 
Process 
Intrusion 
Detection/ 
Prevention 
Back-up 
Critical Data 
Change 
Default 
Security 
Settings 
Incident 
Response 
Program 
Incident 
Response 
Program Test 
Clear Screen 
Awareness 
Forced Session 
Expiration 
Maintenance 
Logs 
Multi-Factor 
Authentication 
System Access 
Warning 
Activity Logs Change 
Default 
Account 
Settings 
Maintenance 
Log Review 
Temporarily 
Disable Absent 
Employee 
Accounts 
Vulnerability 
Assessment: 
Administrative 
Privileges 
Activity Log 
Monitoring 
Last 
Successful 
Logon 
Business 
Continuity 
Plan Test 
Network 
Diagram 
Test Back-up 
Recovery 
Formal TSP 
Selection 
Penetration 
Testing 
Social 
Engineering 
Security 
Awareness 
Spyware 
Protection 
Virus 
Protection 
Security 
Cameras 
Physical 
Security 
Awareness 
Motion 
Sensors 
Restricted 
Access Area 
Formal 
Patching 
Process 
Monitor 
Placements 
Dual Power 
Supply 
Firewall Alert Reporting Back-up 
Critical Data 
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Activity Log 
Monitoring 
Remove 
Unnecessary 
Software 
Maintenance 
Logs 
Uninterruptible 
Power Supply 
Off-Site 
Backup 
Power 
Conditioning 
Disable / 
Remove 
Hardware 
Dust Filtering Humidity 
Control 
Temperature 
Control 
Locked Door Biometrics Content 
Filtering 
Disable 
Terminated 
Employee 
Accounts 
Inactive 
Lockout 
Business 
Continuity 
Plan 
Vulnerability 
Assessment 
Off-Site 
Backup 
Formal TSP 
Review 
Monitored 
Location 
Network 
Diagram 
Line 
Disconnect 
Backup 
Generator 
Redundant 
Systems 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2.5 Step Five Residual Risk 
 In this step, the SMFI built on their previous four steps to determine what the 
residual risk is for their institution technology assets. The SMFI can see what residual 
risk is left after they apply their controls.  In this specific SMFI, they were able to see that 
they have been doing a good job protecting their assets, however, they could do more to 
protect their router, switch, desktop computers, and core banking system.  The order of 
volatility, which indicates the assets that have the highest need for further protection for 
the anonymous SMFI, is listed below.  
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1- Router 
2- Switch 
3- Desktop Computers 
4- Core Banking System 
5- Deposit Platform 
6- Firewall 
7- FinCen 
8- Advantage ATM 
9- Anti-Virus Software 
10- Check Ordering Website 
11- Credit Bureau Website 
12- E-Mail 
13- Funds Transfer System 
14- Internet Banking System 
15- Printers 
This part of the RA process allows the SMFI to see what order they should 
consider applying future controls to protect their information systems. This helps the 
SMFI determine where they should apply their IT security budget.  
Further, the SMFI viewed what more controls would mean to their overall 
security. This step naturally leads to step six, Demonstrate Compliance.  
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5.2.6 Step Six Demonstrate Compliance 
 By this step, the SMFI has viewed their assets, threats, controls, and residual risk, 
and they can see if they are at an adequate protection level for their governing board, 
which is the FDIC. FDIC mandates an annual RA conducted by the management team, if 
the RA is at this step in the process they are indeed in compliance.   
In this specific case study, the SMFI found that their actions were acceptable to 
their industry.  However, they saw improvements that could be made to their institution 
that would further protect their institution. The main improvements, as indicated by 
SMERAM, should be on the router, switch, desktops and core banking system.  The 
SMFI also determine that future controls for each of those assets should include an 
Incidence Response Program, UPS, Physical Security Awareness, Penetration Testing, 
and Log File Reviews.   These controls, some of which don’t have a monetary price tag, 
would significantly improve their assets security.  
 
5.2.7 Step Seven Apply Organizational Controls 
 In the final step, the SMFI looked at available organization security controls that 
they could implement.  Admittedly, the SMFI stated they didn’t do much in terms of 
organization security awareness. The SMFI reviewed available security controls available 
at the organizational level.  Examples include security awareness posters, emails, and 
informational sessions.   
 For this specific SMFI, they determined implementing monthly security 
awareness emails, and a security awareness program was a great way to start increasing 
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the overall security level of the financial institution.  
  
5.4 Year Two Follow Up Meeting (Fall 2008) 
The year two follow up meeting, which was held during the Fall of 2008, gave the 
researchers the ability to see the model integrated into the SMFI over the course of the 
year.  The researchers were focused on seeing how the SMFI felt SMERAM helped them 
address their information security needs, while also being user friendly to the 
management team conducting the RA.  
The management team stated they were successful in getting most of their 
proposal approved by the board of directors; which included the Incidence Response 
Program, Physical Security Awareness, and UPS’s. The management team further stated 
that they will continue conducting RA’s and will use the initial RA as a baseline to view 
how their IT security is improving.  
The management team continued to state they updated their RA during the year 
and could see a graphical depiction of how their information security improved over the 
course of the year in SMERAM.   For example, the SMFI could see how conducting a 
vulnerability assessment, and moving backups offsite increased their security level on 
their assets.  The management team also stated that within the month, they would begin 
their year two RA.  
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6.0 Conclusion  
6.1 Conclusion 
Financial Institutions by nature house data that is susceptible to attacks and other 
malicious actions.  The data that is housed in financial institutions can result in identity 
theft if compromised by a data breach.  Due to the inherent risks associated with the 
financial industry there are regulation requirements that are specific to the financial 
industry.   
Financial institutions, of all sizes, are required to conduct a risk assessment (RA) 
every year by the FDIC.   Large financial institutions, which are typically billions in 
financial assets, have different abilities and needs compared to smaller financial 
institutions which are typically millions in financial assets. However, according to the 
FDIC, both institution sizes have the same regulations and requirements for risk 
management. Large and small financial institutions have the same FDIC regulation but 
different resources available in terms of IT staffing, IT budgets, and overall security 
needs yet overall the FDIC regulations are written in a one-size-fits-all environment.  
           Small and Medium Sized Financial Institutions (SMFIs) understand they are 
required by the FDIC to conduct a RA, and they typically approach this process in a 
manner to appease regulators.  The RA process that SMFIs take does not typically result 
in an accurate RA or add value to their organization (Streff, 2007).  RA’s for SMFIs need 
to identify assets and service providers, outline the risk with each asset, list the 
countermeasures applied to each asset and demonstrate how effective their current 
mitigating approach is in reducing the risk to the financial institution (Podhradsky, 2009).   
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However, a majority of SMFIs handle the RA process in a completely different fashion 
where bankers pass around an excel spreadsheet and various people throughout the bank 
list assets and the approach taken to secure the device (Streff, 2007).  This process not 
only results in a grossly inaccurate RA, but it also adds no value to the organization.  
When organizations conduct RA’s in this manner, they are only completing this 
assessment to conciliate government FDIC regulation, and not using it as a tool for their 
overall risk management process (Streff, 2007).  
  Generic RA models have been developed and deployed across several industries, 
including banking; however generic RA models assume a high level of understanding 
about banking assets, risks, threats, risk mitigation, and information security policy which 
is typically found in larger financial institutions.  This type of advanced knowledge is 
usually not found in management (Gautam, 1989). SMFIs need a different approach to 
solving their information security RA process than their larger financial institutions 
counterparts.  The generic models implemented by larger financial institutions are not 
applicable to smaller institutions, due to their IT staffing, IT budget, and IT security 
limitations.  A RA model for a SMFI should also include both an asset and organizational 
assessment (Streff, 2007).  Larger financial organizations have the financial and staffing 
resources to conduct both an asset and organizational based assessment, however SMFIs 
need to incorporate both assessments into one single assessment (Streff, 2007).  
The generic model, SMERAM, which is honed for the specific use in small and 
medium sized financial institutions, was developed after studying the generic risk 
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assessment models ISO, NIST, OCTAVE, COBIT and CORAS. SMERAM was built on 
these specific generic RA models. 
SMFIs have unique needs that are not adequately addressed with most generic RA 
models. An RA model for SMFIs needs to address FDIC regulations, IT staffing 
limitations, financial resource restrictions, all while being tailored towards the banking 
industry.  SMERAM works to address the unique needs of SMFIs.  
SMERAM meets FDIC FIL guidelines as it is designed for the RA to be 
completed every year, and reviewed on an ongoing basis. Furthermore, SMERAM also 
encourages SMFIs to update their RA whenever there is a major change in their network 
or information technology infrastructure, which keeps the RA an adaptive and living part 
of the information security program. This approach adds value to the organization as it 
helps the financial institution identify and outline their current security posture and 
allows them make informed decisions regarding their information technology purchases 
and upgrades.  
IT staffing limitations are met with SMERAM as financial institutions do not 
need a dedicated IT department or staff member on-site to complete the RA.  Risk 
management is a management responsibility and a member of the management team can 
conduct the RA (Streff, 2007).  SMERAM has been specifically created to be completed 
by both technical and non-technical personnel.  Other Generic RA models require a 
certified consultant or full time IT staff to complete the RA, while SMERAM does not.  
This unique characteristic of SMERAM reduces the cost of implementation and 
maintenance which is not typically seen in other generic RA models.    
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The smaller IT budgets associated with SMFIs are also factored into SMERAM.  
Most generic RA models such as ISO, NIST, or COBIT require a certified consultant or 
IT staff to complete the RA, while SMERAM does not, which results in reduced costs for 
completing a valid and value added RA.  Also, SMERAM does not have any subscription 
costs associated with its implementation, which is unlike other generic RA models.  
SMERAM further adds value to the financial institution as it completes both an 
asset and organizational RA.  Not all generic RA models evaluate security in both an 
asset and organizational level as SMERAM does. This approach saves time and money 
for SMFIs as only one RA has to be completed.  
 
6. 2 Future Work  
The researchers theorize that one way to overcome such diversity and complexity 
of RA’s is to create cohorts of similar businesses. The creation of these “risk assessment 
realms” will allow for the application and development of tighter standards which can 
then be applied to each realm. This will also help to overcome the immense diversity 
among businesses, organizations, and industries, and allow for a relative comparison of 
threats, probabilities, impacts, and assets to similar organizations. A key value to creating 
risk realms based on organization size, industry type, or business unit would be the 
creation of accurate, comparable risk assessments to other organizations in the same 
realm. Data mining for historical purposes and future trends would then be possible.  
The goal of future research would be to identify key “realms” and related fields, 
then provide a common framework for accurately and consistently measuring risk for the 
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identified realms. The author proposes defining systems and risks as associated with a 
particular industry for the creation of these realms. While many of the pre-defined threats 
and their corresponding impacts, probability and volume will apply across several 
industries, the author feels it is important to compile these lists individually.  
Upon completion of identifying a particular realm, the author feels there is need 
for future research and the creation of a “risk assessment artifact”. This would allow for 
the uniform, standardized risk assessment process which is specifically aimed at 
particular cohort. The researchers also feel that by introducing network discovery 
protocols integrating SMERAM into these other realms.  
 
 
6.3  Limitations of SMEREAM 
  SMERAM has known limitations, which includes implementation outside of the 
financial sector. SMERAM, has been tailored towards specific implementation in 
SMFI’s, and in its current form, it isn’t appropriate for implementation outside of the 
financial sector.  
 SMEREAM was also tested in a single SMFI, according to Yin a single case 
study is sufficient, and there was only one full implementation of the model. 
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Appendix A: 
FDIC FIL 68-99 
Risk Assessment Tools and Practices  
for Information System Security  
INTRODUCTION  
The purpose of this paper is to provide financial institutions and examiners with background 
information and guidance on various risk assessment tools and practices related to information 
security. Institutions using the Internet or other computer networks are exposed to various 
categories of risk that could result in the possibility of financial loss and reputational harm. 
Given the rapid growth of the Internet and networking technology, the available risk 
assessment tools and practices are becoming more important for information security.  
This paper provides a summary of critical points, discusses components of a sound 
information security program, and describes the risk assessment and risk management 
processes for information security. The appendix provides specific information on certain risk 
assessment tools and practices that may be part of an institution's information security 
program. The paper and appendix are intended to provide useful information and guidance, 
not to create new examination standards, impose new regulatory requirements, or represent an 
exclusive description of the various ways financial institutions can implement effective 
information security programs. 
Whether financial institutions contract with third-party providers
1
 for computer services such 
as Internet banking, or maintain computer services in-house, bank management is responsible 
for ensuring that systems and data are protected against risks associated with emerging 
technologies and computer networks. If a bank is relying on a third-party provider, 
management must generally understand the provider's information security program to 
effectively evaluate the security system's ability to protect bank and customer data. 
The FDIC has previously issued guidance on information security concerns such as data 
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privacy and confidentiality, data integrity, authentication, non-repudiation, and access 
control/system design. This paper is designed to supplement Financial Institution Letter 131-
97, "Security Risks Associated With the Internet," dated December 18, 1997, and to 
complement the FDIC's safety and soundness electronic banking examination procedures. 
Related guidance can be found in the FFIEC Information Systems Examination Handbook. 
SUMMARY OF CRITICAL POINTS 
To ensure the security of information systems and data, financial institutions should have a 
sound information security program that identifies, measures, monitors, and manages potential 
risk exposure. Fundamental to an effective information security program is ongoing risk 
assessment of threats and vulnerabilities surrounding networked and/or Internet systems. 
Institutions should consider the various measures available to support and enhance 
information security programs. The appendix to this paper describes certain vulnerability 
assessment tools and intrusion detection methods that can be useful in preventing and 
identifying attempted external break-ins or internal misuse of information systems. Institutions 
should also consider plans for responding to an information security incident.  
INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM 
A financial institution's board of directors and senior management should be aware of 
information security issues and be involved in developing an appropriate information security 
program. A comprehensive information security policy should outline a proactive and ongoing 
program incorporating three components:  
 Prevention  
 Detection  
 Response  
Prevention measures include sound security policies, well-designed system architecture, 
properly configured firewalls, and strong authentication programs. This paper discusses two 
additional prevention measures: vulnerability assessment tools and penetration analyses. 
Vulnerability assessment tools generally involve running scans on a system to proactively 
detect known vulnerabilities such as security flaws and bugs in software and hardware. These 
tools can also detect holes allowing unauthorized access to a network, or insiders to misuse the 
system. Penetration analysis involves an independent party (internal or external) testing an 
institution's information system security to identify (and possibly exploit) vulnerabilities in the 
system and surrounding processes. Using vulnerability assessment tools and performing 
regular penetration analyses will assist an institution in determining what security weaknesses 
exist in its information systems.  
Detection measures involve analyzing available information to determine if an information 
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system has been compromised, misused, or accessed by unauthorized individuals. Detection 
measures may be enhanced by the use of intrusion detection systems (IDSs) that act as a 
burglar alarm, alerting the bank or service provider to potential external break-ins or internal 
misuse of the system(s) being monitored. 
Another key area involves preparing a response program to handle suspected intrusions and 
system misuse once they are detected. Institutions should have an effective incident response 
program outlined in a security policy that prioritizes incidents, discusses appropriate responses 
to incidents, and establishes reporting requirements. 
The appendix provides a detailed discussion on prevention (vulnerability assessment tools and 
penetration analyses), detection (IDS tools), and response measures. Before implementing 
some or all of these measures, an institution should perform an information security risk 
assessment. Depending on the risk assessment, certain risk assessment tools and practices 
discussed in this paper may be appropriate. However, use of these measures should not result 
in decreased emphasis on information security or the need for human expertise. 
RISK ASSESSMENT/MANAGEMENT 
A thorough and proactive risk assessment is the first step in establishing a sound security 
program. This is the ongoing process of evaluating threats and vulnerabilities, and establishing 
an appropriate risk management program to mitigate potential monetary losses and harm to an 
institution's reputation. Threats have the potential to harm an institution, while vulnerabilities 
are weaknesses that can be exploited. 
The extent of the information security program should be commensurate with the degree of 
risk associated with the institution's systems, networks, and information assets. For example, 
compared to an information-only Web site, institutions offering transactional Internet banking 
activities are exposed to greater risks. Further, real-time funds transfers generally pose greater 
risks than delayed or batch-processed transactions because the items are processed 
immediately. The extent to which an institution contracts with third-party vendors will also 
affect the nature of the risk assessment program. 
Performing the Risk Assessment and Determining Vulnerabilities 
Performing a sound risk assessment is critical to establishing an effective information security 
program. The risk assessment provides a framework for establishing policy guidelines and 
identifying the risk assessment tools and practices that may be appropriate for an institution. 
Banks still should have a written information security policy, sound security policy guidelines, 
and well-designed system architecture, as well as provide for physical security, employee 
education, and testing, as part of an effective program. 
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When institutions contract with third-party providers for information system services, they 
should have a sound oversight program. At a minimum, the security-related clauses of a 
written contract should define the responsibilities of both parties with respect to data 
confidentiality, system security, and notification procedures in the event of data or system 
compromise. The institution needs to conduct a sufficient analysis of the provider's security 
program, including how the provider uses available risk assessment tools and practices. 
Institutions also should obtain copies of independent penetration tests run against the 
provider's system.  
When assessing information security products, management should be aware that many 
products offer a combination of risk assessment features, and can cover single or multiple 
operating systems. Several organizations provide independent assessments and certifications 
of the adequacy of computer security products (e.g., firewalls). While the underlying product 
may be certified, banks should realize that the manner in which the products are configured 
and ultimately used is an integral part of the products' effectiveness. If relying on the 
certification, banks should understand the certification process used by the organization 
certifying the security product. Other examples of items to consider in the risk assessment 
process include:  
 Identifying mission-critical information systems, and determining the effectiveness of 
current information security programs. For example, a vulnerability might involve 
critical systems that are not reasonably isolated from the Internet and external access 
via modem. Having up-to-date inventory listings of hardware and software, as well as 
system topologies, is important in this process.  
 Assessing the importance and sensitivity of information, and the likelihood of outside 
break-ins (e.g., by hackers) and insider misuse of information. For example, if a large 
depositor list were made public, that disclosure could expose the bank to reputational 
risk and the potential loss of deposits. Further, the institution could be harmed if 
human resource data (e.g., salaries and personnel FILes) were made public. The 
assessment should identify systems that allow the transfer of funds, other assets, or 
sensitive data/confidential information, and review the appropriateness of access 
controls and other security policy settings.  
 Assessing the risks posed by electronic connections with business partners. The other 
entity may have poor access controls that could potentially lead to an indirect 
compromise of the bank's system. Another example involves vendors that may be 
allowed to access the bank's system without proper security safeguards, such as 
firewalls. This could result in open access to critical information that the vendor may 
have "no need to know."  
 Determining legal implications and contingent liability concerns associated with any of 
the above. For example, if hackers successfully access a bank's system and use it to 
subsequently attack others, the bank may be liable for damages incurred by the party 
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that is attacked.  
Potential Threats To Consider 
Serious hackers, interested computer novices, dishonest vendors or competitors, disgruntled 
current or former employees, organized crime, or even agents of espionage pose a potential 
threat to an institution's computer security. The Internet provides a wealth of information to 
banks and hackers alike on known security flaws in hardware and software. Using almost any 
search engine, average Internet users can quickly find information describing how to break 
into various systems by exploiting known security flaws and software bugs. Hackers also may 
breach security by misusing vulnerability assessment tools to probe network systems, then 
exploiting any identified weaknesses to gain unauthorized access to a system. Internal misuse 
of information systems remains an ever-present security threat.  
Many break-ins or insider misuses of information occur due to poor security programs. 
Hackers often exploit well-known weaknesses and security defects in operating systems that 
have not been appropriately addressed by the institution. Inadequate maintenance and 
improper system design may also allow hackers to exploit a security system. New security 
risks arise from evolving attack methods or newly detected holes and bugs in existing software 
and hardware. Also, new risks may be introduced as systems are altered or upgraded, or 
through the improper setup of available security-related tools. An institution needs to stay 
abreast of new security threats and vulnerabilities. It is equally important to keep up to date on 
the latest security patches and version upgrades that are available to fix security flaws and 
bugs. Information security and relevant vendor Web sites contain much of this information.  
Systems can be vulnerable to a variety of threats, including the misuse or theft of passwords. 
Hackers may use password cracking programs to figure out poorly selected passwords. The 
passwords may then be used to access other parts of the system. By monitoring network 
traffic, unauthorized users can easily steal unencrypted passwords. The theft of passwords is 
more difficult if they are encrypted. Employees or hackers may also attempt to compromise 
system administrator access (root access), tamper with critical FILes, read confidential e-mail, 
or initiate unauthorized e-mails or transactions.  
Hackers may use "social engineering," a scheme using social techniques to obtain technical 
information required to access a system. A hacker may claim to be someone authorized to 
access the system such as an employee or a certain vendor or contractor. The hacker may then 
attempt to get a real employee to reveal user names or passwords, or even set up new 
computer accounts. Another threat involves the practice of "war dialing," in which hackers use 
a program that automatically dials telephone numbers and searches for modem lines that 
bypass network firewalls and other security measures. A few other common forms of system 
attack include:  
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 Denial of service (system failure), which is any action preventing a system from 
operating as intended. It may be the unauthorized destruction, modification, or delay of 
service. For example, in a "SYN Flood" attack, a system can be flooded with requests 
to establish a connection, leaving the system with more open connections than it can 
support. Then, legitimate users of the system being attacked are not allowed to connect 
until the open connections are closed or can time out.  
 Internet Protocol (IP) spoofing, which allows an intruder via the Internet to effectively 
impersonate a local system's IP address in an attempt to gain access to that system. If 
other local systems perform session authentication based on a connection's IP address, 
those systems may misinterpret incoming connections from the intruder as originating 
from a local trusted host and not require a password.  
 Trojan horses, which are programs that contain additional (hidden) functions that 
usually allow malicious or unintended activities. A Trojan horse program generally 
performs unintended functions that may include replacing programs, or collecting, 
falsifying, or destroying data. Trojan horses can be attached to e-mails and may create 
a "back door" that allows unrestricted access to a system. The programs may 
automatically exclude logging and other information that would allow the intruder to 
be traced.  
 Viruses, which are computer programs that may be embedded in other code and can 
self-replicate. Once active, they may take unwanted and unexpected actions that can 
result in either nondestructive or destructive outcomes in the host computer programs. 
The virus program may also move into multiple platforms, data files, or devices on a 
system and spread through multiple systems in a network. Virus programs may be 
contained in an e-mail attachment and become active when the attachment is opened.  
 
CONCLUSION 
It is important for financial institutions to develop and implement appropriate information 
security programs. Whether systems are maintained in-house or by third-party vendors, 
appropriate security controls and risk management techniques must be employed. A security 
program includes effective security policies and system architecture, which may be supported 
by the risk assessment tools and practices discussed in this guidance paper and appendix. 
Information security threats and vulnerabilities, as well as their countermeasures, will 
continue to evolve. As such, institutions should have a proactive risk assessment process that 
identifies emerging threats and vulnerabilities to information systems.  
A sound information security policy identifies prevention, detection, and response measures. 
The appendix provides more details on risk assessment tools and practices that may be used to 
improve information security programs. Preventive measures may include regularly using 
vulnerability assessment tools and conducting periodic penetration analyses. Intrusion 
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detection tools can be effective in detecting potential intrusions or system misuse. Institutions 
should also develop a response program to effectively handle any information security 
breaches that may occur.  
 
1
 For the purposes of this paper, "third-party provider" is broadly defined. Third-party 
providers include entities that may provide the following services or products to institutions: 
system design, development, administration, and maintenance services; data processing 
services; and hardware and/or software solutions.  
  
APPENDIX 
PART ONE – PREVENTION: Discusses the use of vulnerability assessment tools and 
penetration analyses. When used regularly, both techniques can be integral components of an 
institution's information security program.  
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT TOOLS 
Vulnerability assessment tools, also called security scanning tools, assess the security of 
network or host systems and report system vulnerabilities. These tools can scan networks, 
servers, firewalls, routers, and applications for vulnerabilities. Generally, the tools can detect 
known security flaws or bugs in software and hardware, determine if the systems are 
susceptible to known attacks and exploits, and search for system vulnerabilities such as 
settings contrary to established security policies.  
In evaluating a vulnerability assessment tool, management should consider how frequently the 
tool is updated to include the detection of any new weaknesses such as security flaws and 
bugs. If there is a time delay before a system patch is made available to correct an identified 
weakness, mitigating controls may be needed until the system patch is issued.  
Generally, vulnerability assessment tools are not run in real-time, but they are commonly run 
on a periodic basis. When using the tools, it is important to ensure that the results from the 
scan are secure and only provided to authorized parties. The tools can generate both technical 
and management reports, including text, charts, and graphs. The vulnerability assessment 
reports can tell a user what weaknesses exist and how to fix them. Some tools can 
automatically fix vulnerabilities after detection. 
Host- Versus Network-Based Vulnerability Assessment Tools 
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As in intrusion detection systems, which are discussed later in this appendix, there are 
generally two types of vulnerability assessment tools: host-based and network-based. Another 
category is sometimes used for products that assess vulnerabilities of specific applications 
(application-based) on a host. A host is generally a single computer or workstation that can be 
connected to a computer network. Host-based tools assess the vulnerabilities of specific hosts. 
They usually reside on servers, but can be placed on specific desktop computers, routers, or 
even firewalls. Network-based vulnerability assessment tools generally reside on the network, 
specifically analyzing the network to determine if it is vulnerable to known attacks. Both host- 
and network-based products offer valuable features, and the risk assessment process should 
help an institution determine which is best for its needs. Information systems personnel should 
understand the types of tools available, how they operate, where they are located, and the 
output generated from the tools. 
Host-based vulnerability assessment tools are effective at identifying security risks that result 
from internal misuse or hackers using a compromised system. They can detect  
holes that would allow access to a system such as unauthorized modems, easily guessed 
passwords, and unchanged vendor default passwords. The tools can detect system 
vulnerabilities such as poor virus protection capabilities; identify hosts that are configured 
improperly; and provide basic information such as user log-on hours, password/account 
expiration settings, and users with dial-in access. The tools may also provide a periodic check 
to confirm that various security policies are being followed. For instance, they can check user 
permissions to access FILes and directories, and identify FILes and directories without 
ownership. 
Network-based vulnerability assessment tools are more effective than host-based at detecting 
network attacks such as denial of service and Internet Protocol (IP) spoofing. Network tools 
can detect unauthorized systems on a network or insecure connections to business partners. 
Running a host-based scan does not consume network overhead, but can consume processing 
time and available storage on the host. Conversely, frequently running a network-based scan 
as part of daily operations increases network traffic during the scan. This may cause 
inadvertent network problems such as router crashes.  
PENETRATION ANALYSIS 
After the initial risk assessment is completed, management may determine that a penetration 
analysis (test) should be conducted. For the purpose of this paper, "penetration analysis" is 
broadly defined. Bank management should determine the scope and objectives of the analysis. 
The scope can range from a specific test of a particular information system's security or a 
review of multiple information security processes in an institution. 
A penetration analysis usually involves a team of experts who identify an information system's 
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vulnerability to a series of attacks. The evaluators may attempt to circumvent the security 
features of a system by exploiting the identified vulnerabilities. Similar to running 
vulnerability scanning tools, the objective of a penetration analysis is to locate system 
vulnerabilities so that appropriate corrective steps can be taken.  
The analysis can apply to any institution with a network, but becomes more important if 
system access is allowed via an external connection such as the Internet. The analysis should 
be independent and may be conducted by a trusted third party, qualified internal audit team, or 
a combination of both. The information security policy should address the frequency and 
scope of the analysis. In determining the scope of the analysis, items to consider include 
internal vs. external threats, systems to include in the test, testing methods, and system 
architectures.  
A penetration analysis is a snapshot of the security at a point in time and does not provide a 
complete guaranty that the system(s) being tested is secure. It can test the effectiveness of 
security controls and preparedness measures. Depending on the scope of the analysis, the 
evaluators may work under the same constraints applied to ordinary internal or external users. 
Conversely, the evaluators may use all system design and implementation documentation. It is 
common for the evaluators to be given just the IP address of the  
institution and any other public information, such as a listing of officers that is normally 
available to outside hackers. The evaluators may use vulnerability assessment tools, and 
employ some of the attack methods discussed in this paper such as social engineering and war 
dialing. After completing the agreed-upon analysis, the evaluators should provide the 
institution a detailed written report. The report should identify vulnerabilities, prioritize 
weaknesses, and provide recommendations for corrective action. 
A penetration analysis itself can introduce new risks to an institution; therefore, several items 
should be considered before having an analysis completed, including the following:  
 If using outside testers, the reputation of the firm or consultants hired. The evaluators 
will assess the weaknesses in the bank's information security system. As such, the 
confidentiality of results and bank data is crucial. Just like screening potential 
employees prior to their hire, banks should carefully screen firms, consultants, and 
subcontractors who are entrusted with access to sensitive data. A bank may want to 
require security clearance checks on the evaluators. An institution should ask if the 
evaluators have liability insurance in case something goes wrong during the test. The 
bank should enter into a written contact with the evaluators, which at a minimum 
should address the above items.  
 If using internal testers, the independence of the testers from system administrators.  
 The secrecy of the test. Some senior executives may order an analysis without the 
knowledge of information systems personnel. This can create unwanted results, 
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including the notification of law enforcement personnel and wasted resources 
responding to an attack. To prevent excessive responses to the attacks, bank 
management may consider informing certain individuals in the organization of the 
penetration analysis.  
 The importance of the systems to be tested. Some systems may be too critical to be 
exposed to some of the methods used by the evaluators such as a critical database that 
could be damaged during the test.  
PART TWO – DETECTION: Discusses intrusion detection systems, and using these tools as 
the detection component of an institution's information security program. 
INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS 
Vulnerability assessments and penetration analyses help ensure that appropriate security 
precautions have been implemented and that system security configurations are appropriate. 
The next step is to monitor the system for intrusions and unusual activities. Intrusion detection 
systems (IDSs) may be useful because they act as a burglar alarm, reporting potential 
intrusions to appropriate personnel. By analyzing the information generated by the systems 
being guarded, IDSs help determine if necessary safeguards are in place and are protecting the 
system as intended. In addition, they can be configured to automatically respond to intrusions. 
Computer system components or applications can generate detailed, lengthy logs or audit 
trails that system administrators can manually review for unusual events. IDSs automate the 
review of logs and audit data, which increases the review's overall efficiency by reducing 
costs and the time and level of skill necessary to review the logs.  
Typically, there are three components to an IDS. First is an agent, which is the component that 
actually collects the information. Second is a manager, which processes the information 
collected by the agents. Third is a console, which allows authorized information systems 
personnel to remotely install and upgrade agents, define intrusion detection scenarios across 
agents, and track intrusions as they occur. Depending on the complexity of the IDS, there can 
be multiple agent and manager components. 
Generally, IDS products use three different methods to detect intrusions. First, they can look 
for identified attack signatures, which are streams or patterns of data previously identified as 
an attack. Second, they can look for system misuse such as unauthorized attempts to access 
FILes or disallowed traffic inside the firewall. Third, they can look for activities that are 
different from the user's or system's normal pattern. These "anomaly-based" products (which 
use artificial intelligence) are designed to detect subtle changes or new attack patterns, and 
then notify appropriate personnel that an intrusion may be occurring. Some anomaly-based 
products are created to update normal use patterns on a regular basis. Poorly designed 
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anomaly-based products can trigger frequent false-positive responses.  
Although IDSs may be an integral part of an institution's overall system security, they will not 
protect a system from previously unknown threats or vulnerabilities. They are not self-
sufficient and do not compensate for weak authentication procedures (e.g., when an intruder 
already knows a password to access the system). Also, IDSs often have overlapping features 
with other security products, such as firewalls. IDSs provide additional protections by helping 
to determine if the firewall programs are working properly and by helping to detect internal 
abuses. Both firewalls and IDSs need to be properly configured and updated to combat new 
types of attacks. In addition, management should be aware that the state of these products is 
highly dynamic and IDS capabilities are evolving. 
IDS tools can generate both technical and management reports, including text, charts, and 
graphs. The IDS reports can provide background information on the type of attack and 
recommend courses of action. When an intrusion is detected, the IDS can automatically begin 
to collect additional information on the attacker, which may be needed later for documentation 
purposes. 
Host- Versus Network-Based IDS Tools 
As with vulnerability assessment tools, there are generally two types of IDS products: host-
based and network-based. A third product category is sometimes used for IDSs that look for 
unusual application events (application-based) on a host. Both network- and host-based tools 
offer valuable features, and the risk assessment process should help institutions determine if 
either, or a combination of both, is best for their needs. 
Host-Based IDSs 
Host-based IDSs are also known as audit trail analysis tools or server-based IDSs (often 
placed on servers). A host-based IDS will look for potential intrusions or patterns of misuse by 
monitoring host event activities, audit logs, and other security-related activities. The tools will 
track audit trails from operating systems, applications, Web servers, routers, and firewalls, as 
well as monitor critical FILes for Trojan horses and unauthorized changes. This can provide 
valuable evidence of a break-in and can assist in assessing damage because the intruder's 
actions are logged on the specific hosts. If done in real-time, the IDS can promptly notify the 
bank of unauthorized attempts to gain system administrator (root) controls, access or change 
critical files, or replace log-in programs. 
An important benefit of host-based IDSs is that they are effective in detecting insider misuse 
because they monitor activities on the specific hosts. For example, they can monitor a user's 
attempt to access a restricted file, or an attempt to execute a system administrator's command. 
In addition, they can monitor encrypted transmissions as the data is generally decrypted before 
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it is logged at the host. 
A problem with host-based systems is that notification of the attack is delayed if an agent does 
not examine the audit trail in real-time. This problem relates to the relatively large 
consumption of computer processing speed and disk space that is required to run these 
programs in real-time. If not run in real-time, they still allow a bank to identify larger trends 
and problems with system security. 
Network-Based IDSs 
With network-based IDSs, software or sniffers are placed on one or multiple points 
across the network. The sniffer agent analyzes packets of information moving across the 
network for potential intrusions. Network packets contain data, including the message and 
headers that identify the sending and receiving parties. Network-based IDSs look for patterns 
of misuse, specific types of attacks, and unusual activity such as unexpected volume and types 
of network traffic. Compared to host-based IDSs, certain types of network-orientated attacks 
such as IP spoofing, packet floods, and denial of service, are best detected through packet 
examination. 
Network-based IDSs can detect potential intrusions in real-time, and offer concurrent 
notification and response capabilities to potential intrusions. The software does not need to be 
put on the various hosts throughout the network, thus it is generally easier to monitor and may 
be less expensive than host-based IDSs.  
Network-based IDSs sometimes mistakenly identify normal traffic as an intrusion ("false 
positives") and vice versa ("false negatives"). They can have difficulties detecting slow attacks 
and experience problems with busy networks. Network-based IDSs cannot monitor encrypted 
transmissions (only detect that data is being transferred across the network), and are less 
effective at detecting insider misuse because network packet analysis does not monitor the 
activities on specific hosts.  
Factors to Consider in Evaluating IDSs 
Once it is determined that an IDS is necessary to detect possible security breaches, several 
factors should be considered in evaluating IDSs, including:  
 The comprehensiveness of the attack signature database, including the frequency of 
updates that incorporate newly identified concerns. Most products rely on vendor 
updates, so banks need to assess the timeliness of the IDS vendor's updates. Products 
can be updated through Internet downloads, CD-ROM or floppy disk updates, or even 
manually if the user has a sufficient degree of technical knowledge.  
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 The effectiveness of the IDS in protecting an institution from both internal and 
external threats to a computer system. The IDS should limit the number of false 
positives (incorrectly identifying an attack when none has occurred) and false 
negatives (not identifying an attack when one has occurred).  
 The impact on performance of the network and/or host(s). Generally, IDSs work on a 
real-time basis. Real-time analysis provides quicker notification of potential intrusions; 
however, it can reduce system performance due to the additional memory and 
processing requirements. Non-real-time analysis generally consumes fewer resources, 
but has the disadvantage that the potential intrusion has already occurred. 
Knowledgeable intruders, moreover, can manipulate audit trails, making the after-the-
fact analysis useless in detecting these particular intruders.  
 The security of the IDS itself and how secure the update process is, especially if 
updated remotely.  
 The reporting and automated response capabilities. IDSs will sometimes generate more 
information than can be reviewed by present qualified staff. Also, for privacy  
reasons, management should consider informing all affected system users about the 
scope and type of monitoring being conducted. 
Other things to consider include training and support from the vendor, cost of hardware, 
software, and maintenance agreements, integration with vulnerability assessment tools, and 
configuration capabilities. 
Determining Which is Best for an Institution 
An institution's risk assessment process should first determine whether an IDS is necessary. 
Next, the type or placement of an IDS depends on the priority of identified threats or 
vulnerabilities. If one or a few hosts contain information that management views as critical, a 
host-based IDS may be warranted. If the information is less essential, other controls such as a 
firewall and/or filtering routers may be sufficient to protect the information. If an institution is 
primarily concerned with attacks from the outside or views the entire network system as 
critical, a network-based product may be appropriate. A combination of host- and network-
based IDSs may also be appropriate for effective system security. Management should be 
aware that even after an IDS is in place, there may be other access points to the bank's systems 
that are not being monitored. Management should determine what types of security 
precautions are needed for the other access points. 
The placement of the IDS within the institution's system architecture should be carefully 
considered. The primary benefit of placing an IDS inside a firewall is the detection of attacks 
that penetrate the firewall as well as insider abuses. The primary benefit of placing an IDS 
outside of a firewall is the ability to detect such activities as sweeping, which can be the first 
sign of attack; repeated failed log-in attempts; and attempted denial of service and spoofing 
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attacks. Placing an IDS outside the firewall will also allow the monitoring of traffic that the 
firewall stops. 
PART THREE – RESPONSE: Discusses implementing an incident response strategy for the 
response component of an institution's information security program. 
INCIDENT RESPONSE  
After implementing a defense strategy and monitoring for new attacks, hacker activities, and 
unauthorized insider access, management should develop a response strategy. The 
sophistication of an incident response plan will vary depending on the risks inherent in each 
system deployed and the resources available to an institution. In developing a response 
strategy or plan, management should consider the following:  
 The plan should provide a platform from which an institution can prepare for, address, 
and respond to intrusions or unauthorized activity. The beginning point is to assess the 
systems at risk, as identified in the overall risk assessment, and consider the potential 
types of security incidents.  
 The plan should identify what constitutes a break-in or system misuse, and incidents 
should be prioritized by the seriousness of the attack or system misuse.  
 Individuals should be appointed and empowered with the latitude and authority to 
respond to an incident. The plan should include what the appropriate responses may be 
for potential intrusions or system misuses.  
 A recovery plan should be established, and in some cases, an incident response team 
should be identified.  
 The plan should include procedures to officially report the incidents to senior 
management, the board of directors, legal counsel, and law enforcement agents as 
appropriate.  
Today's products not only can detect intrusions in real-time, but can automatically respond to 
intrusions. Depending on the software, information systems personnel can be notified on a 
real-time basis during an attack, rather than detect the attack afterward during a manual log 
review. Methods of notification can include e-mail, pager, fax, audio alarm, or message 
displays on a computer monitor. Responses can include shutting down the system, logging 
additional information, and disabling a user's account (e.g., by disallowing a particular user 
account or Internet address). Access can be disabled for a period sufficient for information 
systems personnel to review the attack information or verify the user. Also, an institution can 
add warning banners to protected systems, notifying users that they are accessing a protected 
computer system. 
When determining an appropriate response, a distinction should be made between incidents in 
which actual changes to a system are suspected (e.g., changing audit logs) versus incidents in 
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which system misuse is suspected (e.g., unauthorized system access). Attempts to actually 
change the system or data may warrant notifying a security officer, who could reconfigure the 
identified weaknesses and/or communication paths. An appropriate response to system misuse 
may include automatic log-off, warning messages, or notifying the appropriate personnel. 
Not only are attacks often undetected, in many cases identified attacks are not reported. 
Institutions should develop a plan to respond to unauthorized activities and involve law 
enforcement when appropriate. Institutions should report suspected computer crimes and 
computer intrusions on Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) in accordance with the guidelines 
outlined in Financial Institution Letter 124-97, "Suspicious Activity Reporting," dated 
December 5, 1997. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B: 
FDIC FIL  81-05 
 
 
Instructions for Completing the Information Technology Examination Officer’s 
Questionnaire 
 
Please answer the following information security program questions as of the 
examination 
date pre-determined by the FDIC.  The majority of the questions require only a “Yes” or 
“No” response; however, you are encouraged to expand or clarify any response as needed 
directly below each question, or at the end of this document under the heading 
“Clarifying or Additional Comments”.  For any question deemed non-applicable to your 
institution or if the answer is “None”, please respond accordingly (“NA” or “None”).  
Please do not leave responses blank.  At the bottom of this document is a signature block, 
which must be signed by an executive officer attesting to the accuracy and completeness 
of all provided information.    
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I hereby certify that the following statements are true and correct to the best of my 
knowledge and belief. 
 
Officer’s Name and Title 
 
Institution’s Name and Location 
  
 
Officer’s Signature 
 
Date Signed 
 
As of Date 
   
 
This is an official document.  Any false information contained in it may be grounds for 
prosecution and may be punishable by fine or imprisonment. 
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PART 1 – RISK ASSESSMENT  
An IT risk assessment is a multi-step process of identifying and quantifying threats to 
information assets in an effort to determine cost effective risk management solutions.  To 
help us assess your risk management practices and the actions taken as a result of your 
risk assessment, please answer the following questions:     
 
a. Name and title of individual(s) responsible for managing the IT risk assessment 
      process:  
   
b. Names and titles of individuals, committees, departments or others participating 
in the risk assessment process.  If third-party assistance was utilized during this 
process, please provide the name and address of the firm providing the assistance 
and a brief description of the services provided:   
 
c. Completion date of your most recent risk assessment:  
 
d. Is your risk assessment process governed by a formal framework/policy (Y/N)? 
 
e. Does the scope of your risk assessment include an analysis of internal and 
external threats to confidential customer and consumer information as described 
in Part 364, Appendix B, of the FDIC’s Rules and Regulations (Y/N)? 
 
f. Do you have procedures for maintaining asset inventories (Y/N)? 
 
g. Do risk assessment findings clearly identify the assets requiring risk reduction 
strategies (Y/N)? 
 
h. Do written information security policies and procedures reflect risk reduction 
strategies identified in “g” above (Y/N)? 
 
i. Is your risk assessment program formally approved by the Board of Directors at 
least annually (Y/N)?  
 
If yes, please provide the date that the risk assessment program was last approved 
by the Board of Directors:  
 
j. Are risk assessment findings presented to the Board of Directors for review and 
acceptance (Y/N)?   
If yes, please provide the date that the risk assessment findings were last approved 
by the Board of Directors:  
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PART 2 – OPERATIONS SECURITY AND RISK MANAGEMENT 
To help us assess how you manage risk through your information security program, 
please answer the following questions for your environment.  If any of the following 
questions are not applicable to your environment, simply answer “N/A.”  
 
a. Please provide the name and title of your formally designated IT security 
officer: 
  
b. Please provide the name and title of personnel in charge of operations: 
  
c. Do you maintain topologies, diagrams, or schematics depicting your physical 
     and logical operating environment(s) (Y/N)? 
 
d. Does your information security program contain written policies, procedures,  
     and guidelines for securing, maintaining, and monitoring the following systems 
     or platforms: 
 
1. Core banking system (Y/N)?  
2. Imaging (Y/N)? 
3. Fed Line and/or wire transfer (Y/N)? 
4. Local area networking (Y/N)? 
5. Wide-area networking (Y/N)? 
6. Wireless networking – LAN or WAN (Y/N)? 
7. Virtual private networking (Y/N)? 
8. Voice over IP telephony (Y/N)? 
9. Instant messaging (Y/N)? 
10. Portable devices such as PDAs, laptops, cell phones, etc. (Y/N)? 
11. Routers (Y/N)? 
12. Modems or modem pools (Y/N)? 
13. Security devices such as firewall(s) and proxy devices. (Y/N)? 
14. Other remote access connectivity such as GoToMyPC, PcAnyWhere, etc. 
(Y/N)? 
15. Other – please list: 
 
e. Do you have formal logging/monitoring requirements for 1-15 above (Y/N)? 
 
f. Do you have formal configuration, change management, and patch 
                  management procedures for all applicable platforms identified in “d.” above 
                 (Y/N)? 
 
g. Do you have an antivirus management program to protect systems from 
                  malicious content (Y/N)? 
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h. Do you have an anti-spyware management program to protect end-user  
                  systems (Y/N)? 
 
i. Do you have a formal intrusion detection program, other than basic logging, 
for monitoring host and/or network activity (Y/N)?  
 
 
 
Instructions for Completing the Information Technology Examination Officer’s 
Questionnaire 
 
Please answer the following information security program questions as of the examination 
date pre-determined by the FDIC.  The majority of the questions require only a “Yes” or 
“No” response; however, you are encouraged to expand or clarify any response as needed 
directly below each question, or at the end of this document under the heading “Clarifying or 
Additional Comments”.  For any question deemed non-applicable to your institution or if the 
answer is “None”, please respond accordingly (“NA” or “None”).  Please do not leave 
responses blank.  At the bottom of this document is a signature block, which must be signed 
by an executive officer attesting to the accuracy and completeness of all provided 
information.    
 
  
I hereby certify that the following statements are true and correct to the best of my knowledge 
and belief. 
 
Officer’s Name and Title 
 
Institution’s Name and Location 
  
 
Officer’s Signature 
 
Date Signed 
 
As of Date 
   
 
This is an official document.  Any false information contained in it may be grounds for 
prosecution and may be punishable by fine or imprisonment. 
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PART 1 – RISK ASSESSMENT  
An IT risk assessment is a multi-step process of identifying and quantifying threats to 
information assets in an effort to determine cost effective risk management solutions.  To 
help us assess your risk management practices and the actions taken as a result of your 
risk assessment, please answer the following questions:     
 
a. Name and title of individual(s) responsible for managing the IT risk assessment 
process:  
   
k. Names and titles of individuals, committees, departments or others participating in 
the risk assessment process.  If third-party assistance was utilized during this process, 
please provide the name and address of the firm providing the assistance and a brief 
description of the services provided:   
 
l. Completion date of your most recent risk assessment:  
 
m. Is your risk assessment process governed by a formal framework/policy (Y/N)? 
 
n. Does the scope of your risk assessment include an analysis of internal and external 
threats to confidential customer and consumer information as described in Part 364, 
Appendix B, of the FDIC’s Rules and Regulations (Y/N)? 
 
o. Do you have procedures for maintaining asset inventories (Y/N)? 
 
p. Do risk assessment findings clearly identify the assets requiring risk reduction 
strategies (Y/N)? 
 
q. Do written information security policies and procedures reflect risk reduction 
strategies identified in “g” above (Y/N)? 
 
r. Is your risk assessment program formally approved by the Board of Directors at least 
annually (Y/N)?  
 
If yes, please provide the date that the risk assessment program was last approved by 
the Board of Directors:  
 
s. Are risk assessment findings presented to the Board of Directors for review and 
acceptance (Y/N)?   
If yes, please provide the date that the risk assessment findings were last approved by 
the Board of Directors:  
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PART 2 – OPERATIONS SECURITY AND RISK MANAGEMENT 
To help us assess how you manage risk through your information security program, please 
answer the following questions for your environment.  If any of the following questions are 
not applicable to your environment, simply answer “N/A.”  
 
e. Please provide the name and title of your formally designated IT security officer: 
  
f. Please provide the name and title of personnel in charge of operations: 
  
g. Do you maintain topologies, diagrams, or schematics depicting your physical and 
logical  operating environment(s) (Y/N)? 
 
h. Does your information security program contain written policies, procedures, and 
guidelines for  securing, maintaining, and monitoring the following systems or 
platforms: 
 
1. Core banking system (Y/N)?  
2. Imaging (Y/N)? 
3. Fed Line and/or wire transfer (Y/N)? 
4. Local area networking (Y/N)? 
5. Wide-area networking (Y/N)? 
6. Wireless networking – LAN or WAN (Y/N)? 
7. Virtual private networking (Y/N)? 
8. Voice over IP telephony (Y/N)? 
9. Instant messaging (Y/N)? 
10. Portable devices such as PDAs, laptops, cell phones, etc. (Y/N)? 
11. Routers (Y/N)? 
12. Modems or modem pools (Y/N)? 
13. Security devices such as firewall(s) and proxy devices. (Y/N)? 
14. Other remote access connectivity such as GoToMyPC, PcAnyWhere, etc. 
(Y/N)? 
15. Other – please list: 
 
e. Do you have formal logging/monitoring requirements for 1-15 
                                    above (Y/N)? 
 
f. Do you have formal configuration, change management, and  
                                    patch management procedures for all applicable platforms 
                                    identified in “d.”  above (Y/N)? 
 
g. Do you have an antivirus management program to protect systems 
                                    from malicious content (Y/N)? 
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h. Do you have an anti-spyware management program to protect 
                                    end-user systems (Y/N)? 
 
i. Do you have a formal intrusion detection program, other than basic 
                  logging, for monitoring host and/or network activity (Y/N)?  
 
 
j. Has vulnerability testing been performed on internal systems (Y/N)?  
 
 If yes, please provide date performed and by whom: 
 
k. Has penetration testing of your public or Internet-facing  
                  connection(s) been performed (Y/N)?   
 
 If yes, please provide date performed and by whom:  
 
l. Do you have an incident response plan defining responsibilities 
                  and duties for containing damage and minimizing risks to the  
                  institution (Y/N)?  
 
 If yes, does the plan include customer notification procedures (Y/N)? 
   
m. Do you have a physical security program defining and restricting  
                  access to information assets (Y/N)?  
 
n. Do you have a vendor management program (Y/N)?  
 
o.  Are all of your service providers located within the United States 
                                    (Y/N)? 
 
p. Do you have an employee acceptable use policy (Y/N)? 
  
 If yes, please provide how often employees must attest to the 
                                    policy contents: 
 
q. Do you have an employee security awareness training program (Y/N)? 
 
 If yes, please indicate the last date training was provided: 
  
r. Are you planning to deploy new technology within the next 12  
                                    months (Y/N)? 
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 If you answered “Yes”, were the risks associated with this new  
                                    technology reviewed during your most recent risk assessment (Y/N)?  
 
s. Have you deployed new technology since the last FDIC examination  
                        that was not included in your last risk assessment (Y/N)? 
 
t. Is security incorporated into your overall strategic 
planning process (Y/N)? 
 
u. Do you have policies/procedures for the proper disposal of information 
assets (Y/N)? 
  
152 
 
 
 
PART 3 – AUDIT/INDEPENDENT REVIEW PROGRAM 
To help us assess how you monitor operations and compliance with your written 
information security program, please answer the following questions: 
 
a.  Please provide the name and title of your IT auditor or employee  
                          performing internal IT audit functions.  Include who this person reports to,  
                         and a brief description of their education and experience conducting IT audits. 
  
 
b. Do you have a written IT audit/independent review program (Y/N)?  
 
c. Please provide the following information regarding your most recent IT  
        audit/independent review: 
 
 1. Audit Date: 
 2. Firm name (if external): 
 3. Was an audit report produced (Y/N)?  
 4. Date audit report was reviewed and approved by the Board:  
 5. Audit scope and objectives: 
 
d. Does audit coverage include a comparison of actual system configurations to 
documented/baseline configuration standards (Y/N)? 
 
e. Does audit coverage include assessing compliance with the information  
         security program requirements (Y/N)? 
 
f. Does audit coverage include assessing users and system services access  
         rights (Y/N)? 
 
g Is audit involved in your risk assessment process (Y/N)? 
 
h. Briefly describe any security incidents (internal or external) affecting the bank 
or  
 bank customers occurring since the last FDIC IT examination. 
  
i. Briefly describe any known conflicts or concentrations of duties.  
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PART 4 - DISASTER RECOVERY AND BUSINESS CONTINUITY 
To help us assess your preparedness for responding to and recovering from an 
unexpected event, please answer the following: 
 
 a. Do you have an organization-wide disaster recovery and business 
                        continuity program (Y/N)?    
    
  If yes, please provide the name of your coordinator: 
 
b. Are disaster recovery and business continuity plans based upon a business 
impact analyses (Y/N)? 
 
 If yes, do the plans identify recovery and processing priorities (Y/N)?    
 
c. Is disaster recovery and business continuity included in your risk  
            assessment (Y/N)? 
 
d. Do you have formal agreements for an alternate processing site and equipment 
should the need arise to relocate operations (Y/N)? 
 
e. Do business continuity plans address procedures and priorities for 
            returning to permanent and normal operations (Y/N)?  
 
f. Do you maintain offsite backups of critical information (Y/N)? 
 
 If “Yes,” is the process formally documented and audited (Y/N)? 
 
g. Do you have procedures for testing backup media at an offsite location (Y/N)?  
  
 
h. Have disaster recovery/business continuity plans been tested (Y/N)? 
 
 If “Yes”, please identify the system(s) tested, the corresponding test date, and 
the date reported to the Board:    
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PART 5 – Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act/FDIC Rules and Regulations – 12 CFR Part 364 
Appendix B 
The Interagency Guidelines Establishing Information Security Standards require each 
bank to have a comprehensive written information security program that includes 
administrative, technical, and physical safeguards appropriate to the size and complexity 
of the bank and the nature and scope of its activities.  Please answer the following 
questions pertaining to your written information security program: 
  
 a. Has management developed a written information security program 
                        meeting the information security standards of Part 364,  
                        Appendix B (Y/N)? 
 
  If you answered “Yes” to question “a” above, please provide the date that 
the Board of Directors last approved the written information security 
program:  
 
 b. Please provide the names and titles and/or committee members charged 
               with formally overseeing and implementing Part 364, Appendix B,  
               requirements:  
 
 c. Are compliance audits of your Part 364 standards periodically performed  
               and formally reported to the Board of Directors (Y/N)?  
 
  If you answered “Yes” to question “c”, please provide the date of your 
         last Part 364 compliance audit or review: 
 
 d. Have employees received Part 364 related security awareness 
               training (Y/N)? 
 
 e. Please describe the bank’s reporting process for communicating Part 
               364 program and compliance status to the Board of Directors: 
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j. Has vulnerability testing been performed on internal systems (Y/N)?  
 
 If yes, please provide date performed and by whom: 
 
k. Has penetration testing of your public or Internet-facing connection(s) been 
performed (Y/N)?   
 
 If yes, please provide date performed and by whom:  
 
l. Do you have an incident response plan defining responsibilities and duties for 
containing damage and minimizing risks to the institution (Y/N)?  
 
 If yes, does the plan include customer notification procedures (Y/N)? 
   
m. Do you have a physical security program defining and restricting access to 
information assets (Y/N)?  
 
n. Do you have a vendor management program (Y/N)?  
 
o.  Are all of your service providers located within the United States (Y/N)? 
 
p. Do you have an employee acceptable use policy (Y/N)? 
  
 If yes, please provide how often employees must attest to the policy contents: 
 
q. Do you have an employee security awareness training program (Y/N)? 
 
 If yes, please indicate the last date training was provided: 
  
r. Are you planning to deploy new technology within the next 12 months (Y/N)? 
  
 If you answered “Yes”, were the risks associated with this new technology 
                  reviewed during your most recent risk assessment (Y/N)?  
 
 s. Have you deployed new technology since the last FDIC examination that  
      was not included in your last risk assessment (Y/N)? 
 
v. Is security incorporated into your overall strategic planning process (Y/N)? 
 
w. Do you have policies/procedures for the proper disposal of information assets 
(Y/N)? 
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PART 3 – AUDIT/INDEPENDENT REVIEW PROGRAM 
To help us assess how you monitor operations and compliance with your written 
information security program, please answer the following questions: 
 
a.  Please provide the name and title of your IT auditor or employee  
                          performing internal IT audit functions.  Include who this person  
                          reports to, and a brief description of their education and experience 
                         conducting IT audits.   
 
b. Do you have a written IT audit/independent review program (Y/N)?  
 
c. Please provide the following information regarding your most recent 
        IT audit/independent review: 
 
 1. Audit Date: 
 2. Firm name (if external): 
 3. Was an audit report produced (Y/N)?  
 4. Date audit report was reviewed and approved by the Board:  
 5. Audit scope and objectives: 
 
d. Does audit coverage include a comparison of actual system configurations to 
documented/baseline configuration standards (Y/N)? 
 
e. Does audit coverage include assessing compliance with the information 
         security program requirements (Y/N)? 
 
f. Does audit coverage include assessing users and system services access 
         rights (Y/N)? 
 
g Is audit involved in your risk assessment process (Y/N)? 
 
h. Briefly describe any security incidents (internal or external) affecting 
         the bank or bank customers occurring since the last FDIC IT examination. 
  
j. Briefly describe any known conflicts or concentrations of duties.  
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PART 4 - DISASTER RECOVERY AND BUSINESS CONTINUITY 
To help us assess your preparedness for responding to and recovering from an 
unexpected event, please answer the following: 
 
 a. Do you have an organization-wide disaster recovery and business 
                        continuity program (Y/N)?    
    
  If yes, please provide the name of your coordinator: 
 
b. Are disaster recovery and business continuity plans based upon a business 
impact analyses (Y/N)? 
 
 If yes, do the plans identify recovery and processing priorities (Y/N)?    
 
c. Is disaster recovery and business continuity included in your risk  
            assessment (Y/N)? 
 
d. Do you have formal agreements for an alternate processing site and  
equipment should the need arise to relocate operations (Y/N)? 
 
e. Do business continuity plans address procedures and priorities for  
            returning to permanent and normal operations (Y/N)?  
 
f. Do you maintain offsite backups of critical information (Y/N)? 
 
 If “Yes,” is the process formally documented and audited (Y/N)? 
 
g. Do you have procedures for testing backup media at an offsite location (Y/N)?  
  
 
h. Have disaster recovery/business continuity plans been tested (Y/N)? 
 
 If “Yes”, please identify the system(s) tested, the corresponding test date, and 
the date reported to the Board:    
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PART 5 – Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act/FDIC Rules and Regulations – 12 CFR Part 364 
Appendix B 
The Interagency Guidelines Establishing Information Security Standards require each 
bank to have a comprehensive written information security program that includes 
administrative, technical, and physical safeguards appropriate to the size and complexity 
of the bank and the nature and scope of its activities.  Please answer the following 
questions pertaining to your written information security program: 
  
 a. Has management developed a written information security program  
                        meeting the information security standards of Part 364, Appendix B  
                        (Y/N)? 
 
  If you answered “Yes” to question “a” above, please provide the date that 
the Board of Directors last approved the written information security 
program:  
 
 b. Please provide the names and titles and/or committee members charged 
               with formally overseeing and implementing Part 364, Appendix B,  
               requirements:  
 
 c. Are compliance audits of your Part 364 standards periodically performed 
               and formally reported to the Board of Directors (Y/N)?  
 
  If you answered “Yes” to question “c”, please provide the date of your last 
         Part 364 compliance audit or review: 
 
 d. Have employees received Part 364 related security awareness 
               training (Y/N)? 
 
 e. Please describe the bank’s reporting process for communicating Part 364  
               program and compliance status to the Board of Directors: 
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Appendix C 
 
Assets Typical to Small and Medium Sized Financial Institutions 
 
 
 
 
Internet 
Banking 
System 
 
Core Banking 
system 
 
Fund Transfer 
System 
Credit Bureau 
Website 
Deposit 
Platform 
Printers Notebook 
Computers 
Desktop 
Computers 
Firewall Lending 
Program 
Marketing 
Software 
Payday 
Lending 
Payroll 
Software 
PDA’s Router 
Switch  Firewall Smart Phones Terminal 
Services 
Web Server 
Email Server Accounting 
Software 
Background 
Checking 
Website 
Anti-Virus 
Software 
ATM 
Call Reporting 
Software 
HMDA Operating 
Systems 
Merchant Card 
Processing 
System 
Intrusion 
Detection 
System 
File Server Item Imaging Local Area 
Network 
Check Ordering 
Website 
Check Reader / 
Sorter 
VoIP Deb/Credit 
Cards 
Bank Website Application 
Server 
Remote 
Capture 
Systems 
Storage Area 
Network 
Wide Area 
Network 
 
Proof System   
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Appendix D 
 
Controls Typical to Small and Medium Sized Financial Institutions  
 
 
Authorized User 
 Restrictions 
Access Logs Formal TSP Review Formal TSP Selection 
Disable Terminated 
Employee Account 
Access Log 
 Monitoring 
Invalid Attempt 
Lockout 
Strong Passwords 
Unique User Accounts Encrypt Stored Data Formal Patching 
Process 
Inactive Lockout 
Intrusion Detection / 
Prevention Systems 
Back-up Critical Data Change Default 
Security Settings 
Incident Response  
Program 
Incident Response  
Program Test 
Business Continuity 
 Plan 
Clear Screen 
Awareness 
Forced Session  
Expiration 
Maintenance Logs Multi-factor  
Authentication 
System Access 
Warning 
Vulnerability 
Assessment 
Activity Logs Change Default 
 Account Settings 
Maintenance Log 
 Review 
Temporarily Disable 
 Absents Employee  
Accounts 
Vulnerability 
Assessment 
Administrative 
Privileges 
Off-Site Backup Activity Log 
Monitoring 
Last Successful Logon 
Business Continuity Plan 
Test 
Network Diagram Test Back-up Recovery Virus Protection 
Spyware Protection Penetration Testing Social Engineering and  
Security Awareness 
Security Cameras 
Monitored Locations Physical Security 
Awareness 
Motion Sensors Restricted Access Areas 
Maintenance Log 
Review 
Network Diagram Privacy Filer Dual Power Supply 
Disable/Remove 
 Hardware 
Redundant Systems Temperature Control Humidity Control 
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Dust Filtering Power Conditioning Backup Generator Uninterruptible Power  
Supply 
Test Back-up Recovery Line Disconnect Locked Door Monitor Placement 
Encryption Secured Rack or Cage 
for IT assets 
Alert Reporting Internet History  
 
Internet History 
 Monitoring 
Removable Media  
Ban- Personal 
Offsite Removal of files File storage on portable  
device ban 
 
 
 
Appendix E   
Controls specific to assets 
 
Deposit Platform: 
Test Back-up Recovery  
Network Diagram  
Business Continuity Plan Test  
Last Successful Logon  
Activity Log Monitoring  
Off-Site Backup  
Vulnerability Assessment: Administrative Privileges 
Temporarily Disable Absent Employee 
Accounts 
Maintenance Log Review  
Change Default Account Settings  
Activity Logs  
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Vulnerability Assessment  
System Access Warning  
Multi-Factor Authentication 
Maintenance Logs  
Forced Session Expiration  
Clear Screen Awareness  
Business Continuity Plan  
Incident Response Program Test  
Incident Response Program  
Change Default Security Settings  
Back-up Critical Data  
Intrusion Detection / Prevention  
Inactive Lockout  
Formal Patching Process  
Encrypt Stored Data  
Unique User Accounts  
Strong Passwords  
Invalid Attempt Lockout  
Disable Terminated Employee Accounts  
Access Log Monitoring  
Formal TSP Selection  
Formal TSP Review  
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Access Logs  
Unauthorized Access Restrictions 
 
FinCen: 
Strong Passwords 
Virus Protection  
Spyware Protection  
Business Continuity Plan  
Encrypt Stored Data  
Activity Log Monitoring  
Social Engineering Security Awareness  
Penetration Testing  
Clear Screen Awareness  
Forced Session Expiration  
Encrypt Transmitted Data 
Change Default Security Settings  
Change Default Account Settings  
Activity Logs  
Temporarily Disable Absent Employee Accounts 
Last Successful Logon  
Inactive Lockout  
Formal TSP Selection 
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Formal TSP Review  
Disable Terminated Employee Accounts  
Incident Response Program Test  
Incident Response Program  
System Access Warning  
Authorized User Restrictions  
Access Log Monitoring  
Multi-Factor Authentication  
Invalid Attempt Lockout  
Access Logs  
Unique User Accounts  
 
ATM: 
Monitored Location 
Incident Response Program Test  
Incident Response Program  
Business Continuity Plan Test 
Business Continuity Plan  
Restricted Access Area  
Motion Sensors  
Formal TSP Selection  
Formal TSP Review  
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Physical Security Awareness  
Security Cameras  
 
Anti-Virus Software: 
Inactive Lockout  
Clear Screen Awareness  
Network Diagram  
Maintenance Log Review  
Vulnerability Assessment: Administrative Privileges 
 
Temporarily Disable Absent Employee Accounts 
Intrusion Detection / Prevention  
Change Default Account Settings  
Business Continuity Plan Test  
Vulnerability Assessment  
Maintenance Logs 
Last Successful Logon  
Social Engineering Security Awareness  
Incident Response Program Test  
Incident Response Program  
Change Default Security Settings  
Formal Patching Process  
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Multi-Factor Authentication  
Disable Terminated Employee Accounts  
Business Continuity Plan  
Invalid Attempt Lockout  
Access Logs  
Unique User Accounts  
Strong Passwords  
Formal TSP Selection  
Formal TSP Review 
 
 
Check Ordering Website: 
Strong Passwords 
Business Continuity Plan  
Social Engineering Security Awareness  
Virus Protection  
Spyware Protection  
Formal TSP Selection 
Formal TSP Review  
Privacy Filter  
Penetration Testing  
Encrypt Stored Data  
167 
 
 
 
Clear Screen Awareness  
Temporarily Disable Absent Employee Accounts 
Monitor Placement  
Encrypt Transmitted Data  
Forced Session Expiration  
Change Default Account Settings  
Change Default Security Settings  
Authorized User Restrictions  
System Access Warning  
Inactive Lockout  
Multi-Factor Authentication  
Invalid Attempt Lockout  
Disable Terminated Employee Accounts  
Unique User Accounts  
  
Website: 
Strong Passwords 
Temporarily Disable Absent Employee Accounts 
Forced Session Expiration  
Social Engineering Security Awareness  
Last Successful Logon  
Change Default Security Settings  
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Clear Screen Awareness  
Encrypt Transmitted Data 
Incident Response Program Test  
Incident Response Program  
Monitor Placement  
Disable Terminated Employee Accounts  
Inactive Lockout  
Multi-Factor Authentication  
Invalid Attempt Lockout  
Authorized User Restrictions  
Unique User Accounts  
 
 
Core System 
Incidence Response Program 
Privacy Filter  
Security Cameras  
Restricted Access Area  
Physical Security Awareness  
Monitored Location  
Test Back-up Recovery  
Business Continuity Plan Test  
169 
 
 
 
Dual Power Supply  
Temporarily Disable Absent Employee Accounts 
Secured Rack/Cage  
Monitor Placement  
Locked Door  
Line Disconnect  
Spyware Protection  
Activity Log Monitoring 
Vulnerability Assessment: Administrative Privileges 
Encrypt Transmitted Data  
Formal TSP Selection  
Formal TSP Review  
Virus Protection  
Remove Unnecessary Software  
Business Continuity Plan  
Access Log Monitoring  
Back-up Critical Data  
Last Successful Logon  
Forced Session Expiration  
Change Default Security Settings  
Activity Logs  
Alert Reporting  
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Change Default Account Settings  
Inactive Lockout  
Encrypt Stored Data  
Vulnerability Assessment  
Formal Patching Process  
Disable Terminated Employee Accounts  
Access Logs  
Multi-Factor Authentication  
Invalid Attempt Lockout  
Firewall  
Intrusion Detection / Prevention  
Unique User Accounts  
Strong Passwords  
Incident Response Program Test  
Authorized User Restrictions 
Maintenance Logs 
Redundant Systems  
Temperature Control  
Humidity Control  
Dust Filtering  
Disable / Remove Hardware  
Power Conditioning  
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Network Diagram  
Backup Generator  
Social Engineering Security Awareness  
Off-Site Backup  
Uninterruptible Power Supply  
Motion Sensors  
Maintenance Log Review  
Penetration Testing  
Clear Screen Awareness  
 
 Desktop Computers 
Intrusion Protection / Prevention 
Off-Site Backup  
Disable / Remove Hardware  
Business Continuity Plan Test  
Dual Power Supply  
Network Diagram  
Maintenance Logs  
Maintenance Log Review  
Inactive Lockout  
Clear Screen Awareness  
Monitor Placement  
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Encrypt Transmitted Data  
Temporarily Disable Absent Employee Accounts 
Access Log Monitoring  
Restricted Access Area  
Malware Awareness 
Power Conditioning  
Back-up Critical Data  
Authorized User Restrictions  
Spyware Protection  
Uninterruptible Power Supply  
Motion Sensors  
Vulnerability Assessment: Administrative Privileges 
Multi-Factor Authentication  
Virus Protection  
Physical Security Awareness  
Access Logs  
Remove Unnecessary Software  
Security Cameras  
Monitored Location  
Incident Response Program Test  
Last Successful Logon  
Forced Session Expiration  
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Change Default Security Settings  
Disable Unnecessary Services  
Encrypt Stored Data  
Incident Response Program  
Disable Terminated Employee Accounts  
Invalid Attempt Lockout  
Unique User Accounts 
Strong Passwords  
Change Default Account Settings  
Vulnerability Assessment  
Formal Patching Process  
Penetration Testing 
Test Back-up Plan 
Business Continuity Plan 
 
 
 
 
Email: 
Invalid Attempt Lockout 
Physical Security Awareness 
Temperature Control  
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Off-Site Backup  
Activity Log Monitoring  
Penetration Testing  
Redundant Systems  
Test Back-up Recovery  
Formal TSP Selection  
Formal TSP Review  
Business Continuity Plan Test  
Business Continuity Plan  
Internet History Monitoring  
Internet History 
Activity Logs  
Maintenance Log Review  
Uninterruptible Power Supply  
Encrypt Transmitted Data  
Temporarily Disable Absent Employee Accounts 
Maintenance Logs  
Line Disconnect  
Access Log Monitoring  
Spyware Protection  
Virus Protection  
Vulnerability Assessment: Administrative Privileges 
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Authorized User Restrictions  
Last Successful Logon  
Forced Session Expiration  
Change Default Security Settings  
System Access Warning  
Back-up Critical Data  
Remove Unnecessary Software  
Disable Unnecessary Services  
Disable Terminated Employee Accounts  
Access Logs  
Formal Patching Process  
Vulnerability Assessment  
Encrypt Stored Data 
Unique User Accounts  
Strong Passwords  
Intrusion Detection / Prevention  
Multi-Factor Authentication  
Content Filtering  
Incident Response Program Test  
Firewall  
Incident Response Program  
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Firewall: 
Intrusion /Detection Prevention 
Business Continuity Plan  
Backup Generator  
Temperature Control  
Redundant Systems  
Dual Power Supply  
Network Diagram  
Maintenance Logs  
Maintenance Log Review  
Activity Log Monitoring  
Power Conditioning  
Restricted Access Area  
Encrypt Transmitted Data  
Temporarily Disable Absent Employee Accounts 
Access Log Monitoring  
Uninterruptible Power Supply  
Motion Sensors  
Locked Door  
Line Disconnect  
Alert Reporting  
Activity Logs  
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Physical Security Awareness  
Security Cameras  
Monitored Location 
Penetration Testing  
Secured Rack/Cage  
Authorized User Restrictions  
Back-up Critical Data  
Vulnerability Assessment: Administrative Privileges 
Spyware Protection 
Last Successful Logon  
Forced Session Expiration  
Change Default Security Settings  
Incident Response Program Test  
Access Logs  
Virus Protection  
Disable Terminated Employee Accounts  
Incident Response Program  
Unique User Accounts  
Strong Passwords  
Invalid Attempt Lockout  
Disable Unnecessary Services  
Vulnerability Assessment  
178 
 
 
 
Change Default Account Settings  
Formal Patching Process 
Dust Filtering 
Vulnerability Assessment  
Change Default Account Settings  
Formal Patching Process  
Intrusion Detection / Prevention  
Disable / Remove Hardware  
Test Back-up Recovery  
Off-Site Backup  
Business Continuity Plan Test  
Humidity Control  
 
Funds Transfer System 
Dual Power Supply  
Business Continuity Plan Test  
Business Continuity Plan  
Penetration Testing 
Maintenance Logs  
Maintenance Log Review  
Formal TSP Selection  
Formal TSP Review  
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Clear Screen Awareness 
Monitor Placement 
Inactive Lockout  
Line Disconnect  
Vulnerability Assessment: Administrative Privileges 
Temporarily Disable Absent Employee Accounts 
 
Encrypt Transmitted Data  
Access Log Monitoring  
Change Default Security Settings  
Change Default Account Settings  
Alert Reporting  
Disable Unnecessary Services  
Vulnerability Assessment  
Last Successful Logon  
Forced Session Expiration  
Activity Log Monitoring  
Encrypt Stored Data  
System Access Warning  
Firewall  
Intrusion Detection / Prevention  
Multi-Factor Authentication  
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Activity Logs  
Incident Response Program Test  
Disable Terminated Employee Accounts  
Unique User Accounts  
Strong Passwords  
Invalid Attempt Lockout  
Incident Response Program  
Authorized User Restrictions  
Internet Banking Systems 
Incidence Response Program 
Monitored Location  
Clear Screen Awareness  
Uninterruptible Power Supply  
Social Engineering Security Awareness  
Physical Security Awareness  
Penetration Testing  
Maintenance Log Review  
Maintenance Logs  
Dual Power Supply  
Line Disconnect  
Test Back-up Recovery  
Business Continuity Plan Test  
181 
 
 
 
Monitor Placement  
Temporarily Disable Absent Employee Accounts 
Encrypt Transmitted Data  
Business Continuity Plan  
Spyware Protection  
Activity Log Monitoring  
Access Log Monitoring 
Virus Protection  
Back-up Critical Data  
Vulnerability Assessment: Administrative Privileges 
Activity Logs  
Last Successful Logon  
Forced Session Expiration  
Change Default Security Settings  
Encrypt Stored Data  
Alert Reporting  
Change Default Account Settings  
Inactive Lockout  
Disable Terminated Employee Accounts  
Formal TSP Selection  
Formal TSP Review  
Formal Patching Process  
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Authorized User Restrictions  
Access Logs  
Unique User Accounts  
Firewall  
Vulnerability Assessment  
Strong Passwords  
Incident Response Program Test  
Intrusion Detection / Prevention  
Multi-Factor Authentication  
Invalid Attempt Lockout  
Redundant Systems 
No 
Motion Sensors  
Backup Generator  
Temperature Control  
Power Conditioning  
Off-Site Backup  
Network Diagram  
Security Cameras  
Restricted Access Area 
 
Internet Website 
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Incidence Response 
Maintenance Logs  
Maintenance Log Review  
Forced Session Expiration  
Encrypt Stored Data  
Content Filtering  
Clear Screen Awareness  
Change Default Security Settings  
Change Default Account Settings  
Business Continuity Plan  
Authorized User Restrictions  
Unique User Accounts  
Internet History Monitoring  
Internet History  
Encrypt Transmitted Data  
System Access Warning  
Virus Protection  
Spyware Protection  
Incident Response Program Test  
Incident Response Program  
Secured Rack/Cage  
Dual Power Supply  
184 
 
 
 
Multi-Factor Authentication  
Firewall  
Vulnerability Assessment: Administrative Privileges 
Invalid Attempt Lockout  
Intrusion Detection / Prevention  
Strong Passwords  
Vulnerability Assessment  
Formal Patching Process  
Formal TSP Selection  
Formal TSP Review  
 
Printer 
Monitored Location 
Restricted Access Area  
Locked Door  
Physical Security Awareness  
Motion Sensors  
Security Cameras  
 
Router 
Intrusion Detection & Prevention 
Multi-Factor Authentication  
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Business Continuity Plan Test  
Business Continuity Plan  
Backup Generator  
Temperature Control  
Humidity Control  
Dust Filtering  
Disable / Remove Hardware  
Restricted Access Area  
Redundant Systems  
Network Diagram  
Maintenance Logs  
Maintenance Log Review  
Line Disconnect  
Invalid Attempt Lockout  
Power Conditioning  
Temporarily Disable Absent Employee Accounts 
Motion Sensors 
Locked Door  
Access Log Monitoring  
Uninterruptible Power Supply  
Security Cameras 
Monitored Location  
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Physical Security Awareness  
Encrypt Transmitted Data  
Secured Rack/Cage  
Penetration Testing  
Dual Power Supply  
Spyware Protection  
Alert Reporting  
Authorized User Restrictions  
Back-up Critical Data  
Virus Protection  
Vulnerability Assessment: Administrative 
Privileges 
Disable Terminated Employee Accounts  
Firewall  
Unique User Accounts  
Strong Passwords  
Incident Response Program Test  
Incident Response Program  
Change Default Account Settings 
Change Default Security Settings  
Disable Unnecessary Services  
Vulnerability Assessment  
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Switch 
Intrusion Detection & Prevention 
Multi-Factor Authentication  
Business Continuity Plan Test  
Business Continuity Plan  
Backup Generator  
Temperature Control  
Humidity Control  
Dust Filtering  
Disable / Remove Hardware  
Restricted Access Area  
Redundant Systems  
Network Diagram  
Maintenance Logs  
Maintenance Log Review  
Line Disconnect  
Invalid Attempt Lockout  
Power Conditioning  
Temporarily Disable Absent Employee Accounts 
Motion Sensors 
Locked Door  
188 
 
 
 
Access Log Monitoring  
Uninterruptible Power Supply  
Security Cameras 
Monitored Location  
Physical Security Awareness  
Encrypt Transmitted Data  
Secured Rack/Cage  
Penetration Testing  
Dual Power Supply  
Spyware Protection  
Alert Reporting  
Authorized User Restrictions  
Back-up Critical Data  
Virus Protection  
Vulnerability Assessment: Administrative 
Privileges 
Disable Terminated Employee Accounts  
Firewall  
Unique User Accounts  
Strong Passwords  
Incident Response Program Test  
Incident Response Program  
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Change Default Account Settings 
Change Default Security Settings  
Disable Unnecessary Services  
Vulnerability Assessment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix F 
Threats Specific to Assets 
Internet Banking System 
Data Leakage 
Unauthorized System Access 
Phishing     
Defacement  
Pharming   
Eavesdropping / Sniffing    
Intentional Misuse    
Unauthorized Remote Access     
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Degraded / Unavailable    
Malicious Software    
Outsourced    
Unauthorized Physical Access    
Unauthorized Viewing    
User Error    
Environmental Incident    
Man-made / Natural Disaster    
 
Core Banking System 
Data Loss    
Unauthorized System Access    
Intentional Misuse    
Outsourced    
Unauthorized Remote Access    
Degraded / Unavailable    
Hardware Failure    
Unauthorized Physical Access    
Eavesdropping / Sniffing         
Malicious Software    
Unauthorized Viewing    
Social Engineering    
191 
 
 
 
Software Acquisition    
Man-made / Natural Disaster    
Environmental Incident    
User Error    
Funds Transfer System 
Unauthorized System Access    
Eavesdropping / Sniffing    
Degraded / Unavailable    
Malicious Software    
Unauthorized Viewing    
Intentional Misuse    
Unauthorized Remote Access    
User Error       
Outsourced    
Social Engineering    
Man-made / Natural Disaster    
Unauthorized Physical Access   
 
Credit Bureau Website 
User Error    
Data Loss    
Social Engineering    
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Defacement   
Intentional Misuse         
Unauthorized Viewing         
Eavesdropping / Sniffing         
Unauthorized System Access         
Outsourced     
Degraded / Unavailable   
 
Deposit Platform 
Data Loss         
Software Acquisition         
Social Engineering         
Intentional Misuse         
Unauthorized System Access         
Unauthorized Viewing         
User Error         
Man-made / Natural Disaster 
 
Printers 
Theft 
Unauthorized physical access 
Notebook Computers 
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Data Loss         
Theft         
Intentional Misuse         
Unauthorized Physical Access         
Malicious Software         
Connection Of Unauthorized Equipment         
Social Engineering         
Unauthorized Remote Access     
Unauthorized Viewing     
Hardware Failure         
Environmental Incident         
User Error     
Unauthorized System Access     
Degraded / Unavailable         
Eavesdropping / Sniffing     
Man-made / Natural Disaster         
Firewall 
Data Loss     
Theft     
Intentional Misuse         
Unauthorized Physical Access         
Malicious Software         
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Connection Of Unauthorized Equipment         
Social Engineering         
Unauthorized Remote Access         
Unauthorized Viewing         
Hardware Failure         
Environmental Incident         
User Error         
Unauthorized System Access         
Degraded / Unavailable         
Eavesdropping / Sniffing         
Man-made / Natural Disaster     
     
Lending Program 
Social Engineering         
Software Acquisition         
User Error         
Intentional Misuse         
Unauthorized System Access         
Unauthorized Viewing         
Man-made / Natural Disaster         
Data Loss     
Marketing Software 
195 
 
 
 
Data Loss     
Software Acquisition     
Social Engineering     
Unauthorized System Access     
Unauthorized Viewing     
User Error     
Man-made / Natural Disaster         
Intentional Misuse 
 
Payday Lending 
Unauthorized System Access         
Data Loss     
Eavesdropping / Sniffing         
Defacement         
Degraded / Unavailable         
Unauthorized Viewing     
Intentional Misuse     
Social Engineering         
User Error         
Outsourced   
 
Payroll 
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Data Loss     
Intentional Misuse         
Social Engineering         
Software Acquisition     
Unauthorized System Access     
User Error     
Man-made / Natural Disaster     
Unauthorized Viewing   
 
PDA 
Theft     
Data Loss     
Unauthorized System Access     
Environmental Incident     
Unauthorized Viewing     
Malicious Software     
Eavesdropping / Sniffing   
 
 
Router 
Unauthorized Physical Access     
Eavesdropping / Sniffing     
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Unauthorized Remote Access     
Degraded / Unavailable     
Hardware Failure     
Connection Of Unauthorized Equipment     
Unauthorized System Access     
Environmental Incident     
Man-made / Natural Disaster   
 
Switch 
Unauthorized Physical Access         
Eavesdropping / Sniffing     
Unauthorized Remote Access     
Degraded / Unavailable     
Hardware Failure     
Connection Of Unauthorized Equipment     
Unauthorized System Access     
Environmental Incident     
Man-made / Natural Disaster   
 
 
Firewall 
Unauthorized Remote Access     
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Degraded / Unavailable     
Hardware Failure     
Connection Of Unauthorized Equipment     
Unauthorized Physical Access     
Environmental Incident     
Theft     
Man-made / Natural Disaster 
 
Smart Phones 
Theft     
Data Loss     
Unauthorized System Access     
Environmental Incident     
Unauthorized Viewing     
Malicious Software     
Eavesdropping / Sniffing   
 
Terminal Services 
Hardware Failure         
Unauthorized Remote Access     
Unauthorized System Access     
Malicious Software     
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User Error     
Degraded / Unavailable     
Theft     
Man-made / Natural Disaster         
Unauthorized Physical Access     
Connection Of Unauthorized Equipment     
Eavesdropping / Sniffing     
Environmental Incident   
 
Web Server 
Hardware Failure     
Social Engineering         
Intentional Misuse         
Malicious Software     
Outsourced     
Unauthorized System Access     
Degraded / Unavailable     
Unauthorized Physical Access     
Unauthorized Remote Access     
User Error     
Theft     
Environmental Incident     
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Man-made / Natural Disaster     
Connection Of Unauthorized Equipment     
Eavesdropping / Sniffing   
 
Email Server 
Data Loss     
Eavesdropping / Sniffing     
Hardware Failure     
Intentional Misuse     
Social Engineering     
Unauthorized System Access     
Malicious Software     
Outsourced     
Theft     
Unauthorized Physical Access   
Unauthorized Remote Access     
User Error     
Man-made / Natural Disaster     
Connection Of Unauthorized Equipment     
Degraded / Unavailable     
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Environmental Incident   
 
 
Accounting Software 
Data Loss     
Social Engineering     
Software Acquisition     
Man-made / Natural Disaster     
Intentional Misuse     
Unauthorized System Access     
User Error     
Unauthorized Viewing 
 
Background Checking  
Data Loss     
Defacement     
Eavesdropping / Sniffing     
Unauthorized System Access     
User Error     
Intentional Misuse     
Social Engineering     
Unauthorized Viewing     
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Outsourced     
Degraded / Unavailable 
 
 
Anti Virus Software 
Software Acquisition     
Intentional Misuse     
Man-made / Natural Disaster     
Unauthorized System Access     
User Error     
Social Engineering   
 
ATM 
Connection Of Unauthorized Equipment         
Skimming     
Man-made / Natural Disaster     
Theft   
 
Call Reporting 
Social Engineering     
Software Acquisition     
Intentional Misuse     
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Man-made / Natural Disaster     
Unauthorized System Access     
User Error     
Unauthorized Viewing   
 
HMDA 
Data Loss     
Social Engineering     
User Error     
Software Acquisition     
Intentional Misuse     
Man-made / Natural Disaster     
Unauthorized System Access     
Unauthorized Viewing 
 
Operating System 
Malicious Software     
Unauthorized System Access     
Unauthorized Remote Access   
 
Merchant Card Processing 
Unauthorized System Access     
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Eavesdropping / Sniffing     
Degraded / Unavailable     
Malicious Software     
Unauthorized Viewing     
Intentional Misuse     
Unauthorized Remote Access     
User Error     
Outsourced     
Social Engineering     
Man-made / Natural Disaster     
Unauthorized Physical Access   
 
Intrusion Detection 
Unauthorized System Access     
Eavesdropping / Sniffing     
Degraded / Unavailable     
Malicious Software     
Unauthorized Viewing     
Intentional  Misuse   
Unauthorized Remote Access     
User Error     
Outsourced     
205 
 
 
 
Social Engineering     
Man-made / Natural Disaster     
Unauthorized Physical Access   
 
File Server 
Data Loss     
Hardware Failure    
Unauthorized System Access     
Social Engineering     
Theft    
Degraded / Unavailable     
Intentional Misuse     
Malicious Software     
Eavesdropping / Sniffing    
Unauthorized Physical Access     
Unauthorized Remote Access    
User Error     
Connection Of Unauthorized Equipment         
Environmental Incident     
Man-made / Natural Disaster     
 
Item Imaging 
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Data Loss     
Unauthorized System Access     
Hardware Failure     
Degraded / Unavailable     
Intentional Misuse     
Outsourced     
Unauthorized Remote Access     
Social Engineering     
Software Acquisition     
Unauthorized Physical Access     
Unauthorized Viewing     
Eavesdropping / Sniffing     
Environmental Incident     
Malicious Software     
Man-made / Natural Disaster     
User Error     
 
Local Area Network 
Unauthorized Physical Access     
Eavesdropping / Sniffing     
Unauthorized Remote Access     
Degraded / Unavailable     
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Hardware Failure     
Connection Of Unauthorized Equipment     
Unauthorized System Access     
Environmental Incident   1   
Man-made / Natural Disaster   
 
Check Ordering website 
Unauthorized System Access     
Intentional Misuse     
Data Loss     
Defacement     
Degraded / Unavailable     
Eavesdropping / Sniffing     
Unauthorized Viewing     
User Error     
Outsourced     
Social Engineering   
 
Check Reader/Sorter 
Data Loss     
Intentional Misuse     
Theft     
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Unauthorized Viewing     
User Error     
Hardware Failure     
Social Engineering     
Environmental Incident     
Unauthorized System Access     
Malicious Software     
Man-made / Natural Disaster     
Unauthorized Physical Access     
Unauthorized Remote Access     
Connection Of Unauthorized Equipment     
Degraded / Unavailable     
Eavesdropping / Sniffing     
 
VOIP 
Connection Of Unauthorized Equipment     
Unauthorized Physical Access     
Unauthorized Remote Access     
Eavesdropping / Sniffing     
Unauthorized System Access     
Degraded / Unavailable     
Outsourced     
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Hardware Failure    
Man-made / Natural Disaster 
 
Debit/Credit Cards 
Unauthorized System Access     
Eavesdropping / Sniffing     
Degraded / Unavailable     
Malicious Software     
Unauthorized Viewing     
Intentional Misuse     
Unauthorized Remote Access     
User Error         
Outsourced     
Social Engineering     
Man-made / Natural Disaster     
Unauthorized Physical Access    
 
Bank Website 
Unauthorized System Access     
Data Loss     
Defacement     
Eavesdropping / Sniffing     
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Unauthorized Viewing     
Intentional Misuse     
Social Engineering     
Degraded / Unavailable     
User Error     
Outsourced   
 
Application Server 
Malicious Software     
Unauthorized System Access    
Theft     
Degraded / Unavailable     
Hardware Failure     
User Error     
Data Loss     
Social Engineering     
Unauthorized Physical Access     
Unauthorized Remote Access     
Intentional Misuse     
Connection Of Unauthorized Equipment     
Eavesdropping / Sniffing     
Man-made / Natural Disaster     
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Environmental Incident   
 
Remote Capture 
Data Loss     
Unauthorized System Access     
Hardware Failure     
Eavesdropping / Sniffing     
Degraded / Unavailable     
Intentional Misuse     
Outsourced     
Unauthorized Remote Access     
Social Engineering     
Software Acquisition         
Unauthorized Physical Access         
Environmental Incident         
Malicious Software     
Unauthorized Viewing     
Man-made / Natural Disaster     
User Error   
 
Storage Area Network 
Unauthorized Physical Access     
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Eavesdropping / Sniffing     
Unauthorized Remote Access     
Degraded / Unavailable     
Hardware Failure     
Connection Of Unauthorized Equipment     
Unauthorized System Access     
Environmental Incident     
Man-made / Natural Disaster   
 
Wide Area Network 
Eavesdropping / Sniffing     
Unauthorized Physical Access     
Connection Of Unauthorized Equipment     
Unauthorized Remote Access     
Degraded / Unavailable     
Environmental Incident     
Hardware Failure     
Unauthorized System Access     
Man-made / Natural Disaster   
 
Proof System 
Unauthorized System Access     
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Hardware Failure     
Eavesdropping / Sniffing     
Degraded / Unavailable     
Data Loss     
Outsourced     
Unauthorized Remote Access     
Social Engineering     
Software Acquisition     
Unauthorized Physical Access     
Environmental Incident     
Malicious Software     
Unauthorized Viewing     
Intentional Misuse     
Man-made / Natural Disaster     
User Error   
